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ABSTRACT 
Genetically modified (GM) foods have been at the center of a contentious debate. 
One side of the debate includes environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth, who are opposed to GM foods — these groups would like GM foods banned, or at the 
very least they want GM foods to be clearly labeled as such. On the other side of the debate 
are agribusiness companies like Monsanto and Syngenta, who view GM foods positively. 
They think GM foods help the environment and could help feed the malnourished. Both 
groups actively disseminate information on genetically modified foods. 
This dissertation reports on several results from experimental auctions where 
consumers actually had to purchase food products if they won the auctions. Consumers were 
able to accurately read the signals for which food was GM in experimental markets that 
emulated mandatory and voluntary GM-labeling regimes. This shows evidence that the U.S. 
has been prudent in not implementing a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods. 
Consumers place a large value on keeping non-GM foods free from any GM-material (not 
allowing a small "tolerance" for GM-material). Consumers did not place extra value, 
however, on a 1% tolerant food relative to a 5% tolerant food. This provides evidence that if 
the United States chooses a tolerance policy for GM-material, a 5% GM-tolerance may be 
better than a 1% tolerance. 
Currently the information available to consumers on GM foods is from interested 
parties. Chapter 4 shows that a third party source that provides verifiable information on GM 
foods could have a large annual value to U.S. consumers. This value is due to helping 
consumers make more informed choices. Verifiable information can also have value by 
preventing the non-adoption of socially useful inventions. 
ix 
This dissertation also shows that a majority of consumers would either trust the 
government, or an independent third party source for information on GM foods — so if a body 
is created to disseminate this information, a quasi-governmental organization may be the 
most trusted. This dissertation provides a look at many aspects of how information on 
genetically modified foods affects consumer behavior. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Information is central to decision making. Correct decisions depend on accurate 
information. Whether to bring an umbrella to work might depend on the weather forecast 
Buying or selling a stock might depend on information on a company's performance. Which 
food products to buy can also be decided based on current information, especially for new 
products. Genetically modified foods have moved from an abstract concept to reality in a 
very short time. During this short time frame, there has been a number of controversial 
issues regarding genetically modified foods in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. 
This dissertation examines the effects of diverse information on the demand for 
genetically modified foods for a set of randomly chosen adult consumers from two 
Midwestern cities who agreed to participate in a group session dealing with household 
purchase decisions on food and household products. The group sessions were actual 
laboratory auction experiments with randomized information and labeling treatments. Each 
experimental unit consisted of 12-15 adults who were paid $40 to participate in the project, 
which consumed about 90 minutes of their time and required them to make real purchases of 
food items won in the laboratory auction setting. Three food items—vegetable oil, Tortilla 
chips, and Russet potatoes—which might be genetically modified were auctioned. The 
change in demand for genetically modified foods is examined when interested parties and a 
third party provides information and the value of third party, verifiable information source is 
also determined. The effect of the type of food label on the demand of GM foods is also 
examined. Labeling policies and issues of who consumers trust for information are also 
examined in this dissertation. 
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The following delineates the organization of this dissertation. The remainder of this 
chapter reviews the literature on genetically modified foods, the benefits and costs of labeling 
policies, and the impact and value of information. Chapter 2 presents the general 
experimental design that was used. Several issues are discussed in chapter 2, including the 
participants, the auction mechanism, the food products used, and several steps in the 
experiment. Chapter 3 examines whether the United States should impose a mandatory 
labeling policy for genetically modified foods or should continue to use the current voluntary 
system. Chapter 4 examines the impact of information from third party groups and the 
impact and value of information from an independent, third party source of verifiable 
information on genetically modified foods. Chapter 5 examines the consumer demand for 
non-GM foods with a small degree of tolerance for GM-material and non-GM foods that are 
certified to be free of GM-material. Chapter 6 examines the impact of negative and 
verifiable information on resistance to technology. Chapter 7 looks at the economics of trust 
formation, focusing on who consumers trust for information about genetically modified 
foods. Finally, chapter 8 offers some concluding comments, chapter 9 contains the 
references, and chapter 10 contains the appendix, which contains the packet and information 
that was handed to the auction participants. 
1.2. Literature Review 
1.2.1. Types of Labeling Policies that Could be Implemented 
Caswell (1998 and 2000) has shown that there are many possible labeling policies 
that could be implemented, including mandatory labeling of GM foods, voluntary labeling of 
GM foods, or bans on all labeling to indicate whether or not a food is genetically modified. 
The policies that each country chooses are likely to be determined by the information 
3 
demanded by the their consumers. An informed decision on whether or not to implement a 
labeling policy on genetically modified foods should only be undertaken only after a careful 
benefit/cost analysis. Caswell points out that a voluntary labeling program is likely to be a 
better policy option for a country that has only a small segment of the population that is 
concerned about GM foods while a mandatory labeling system is likely the best policy option 
in countries where most of the population wants to know if their food is genetically modified. 
1.2.2. Labeling Policies of Various Countries 
The U.S. government has been supportive of biotechnology and has assumed that the 
regulation of biotechnology should examine the safety of the product and focus less on the 
process. By examining the product, the U.S. issued regulations in 1992 (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1992) saying that GM food did not have to be labeled if the 
food product had the same characteristics as their non-GM counterparts. 
In January 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2001) issued a 
"Guidance for Industry" statement for labeling GM products. In this statement the FDA 
stated that the only GM foods that need to be labeled are foods that have different 
characteristics than the non-GM version. Labeling for GM foods is not required for any 
other GM foods. Firms need to notify the FDA at least four months before putting a new 
GM food on the maricet, and the scientific description of the product is posted on the Internet 
for review during this time (AgBiotech Reporter, February 2001). 
Firms also have the option of voluntarily indicating whether or not their food is 
genetically modified. For firms that choose to label their GM foods, the FDA has mandated 
certain guidelines that must be followed. Foods that are labeled should not use the phrase, 
"genetically modified." Consumer surveys by the FDA found that this misleads consumers 
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into thinking the product has different characteristics. The FDA prefers that foods be labeled 
as "genetically engineered" or "made through biotechnology" instead. 
For countries in the European Union (EU), the EU sets the minimum standards that 
any country should implement Some countries have implemented stricter standards, but no 
country has more lenient standards (Bemauer, 2001). The European Union has a de facto 
moratorium on the approval of any new GM foods which has been in place since April 1998. 
The European Union first implemented a mandatory labeling policy on GM foods in 
1997 with the Novel Foods Regulation. The standards defined by this act required that any 
GM food on the maricet be shown to not harm human health and required labeling if GM 
content could be detected. The Novel Foods Regulation left several exemptions to labeling 
and did not define a standard for the percentage of a product that could be made with GM 
material before it must be labeled. For these reasons, the Commission of the Council 
modified this standard in January 2000 by requiring that all foods require the label 
"genetically modified" if any ingredient in the food is at least one percent GM. 
In February 2001, the European Parliament voted for stricter regulations. The new 
regulations call for stricter labeling and monitoring of GM products, and allow for the tracing 
of GM products all through the food chain (CNN, 2001). These new regulations do not 
eliminate the moratorium on new approvals, and the moratorium will not be removed until 
voted upon. Six countries, Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg claim 
that they will veto any approval of new GM products until stricter rales are enacted. 
Several years ago, Australia, like much of the rest of the world, had no labeling policy 
for GM foods. In order to assess some of the costs that would accompany a labeling policy, 
Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA), the food governing board, commissioned 
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a study by the U.S. accounting/consulting firm KPMG to determine what effects a mandatory 
labeling policy would have on consumer costs for foods. KPMG concluded that consumers 
would have to pay from 0.5 percent to 15 percent more for products with such a policy 
(Phillips and Smith, 2000). Despite commissioning this study, ANZFA disregarded it, citing 
two flaws (Tambling, 2001). 
Australia and New Zealand implemented standards that took effect in December 2001 
(Australia New Zealand Food Authority, October 2000). The new standards require 
"labeling of food and food ingredients where novel DNA and/or novel protein is present in 
the final food." Similar to the policy of the European Union, labeling is not required if no 
ingredient in a food product is more than one percent genetically modified. Labeling is also 
not required for highly refined foods, foods that used GM processing aids that are not present 
in the final food, or food served in restaurants. If it is an ingredient in a product that is 
genetically engineered, the ingredient that is modified must be labeled as "genetically 
modified" in the list of ingredients. For a single ingredient GM food, the phrase "genetically 
modified" must be listed on the front of the packet, next to the name. 
While Australia has a nationwide food standard, states within Australia are suing to 
develop stricter policies to handle GM foods (AgBiotech Reporter, May 2001). If successful, 
the system in Australia could be similar to that of Europe, where the nationwide standard for 
GM foods is the minimum regulations in place regarding GM foods; and many areas have 
stricter regulations. 
Before April 2001, no labeling was required for GM products in Japan. On April 1, 
2001, a new policy was implemented. This new policy requires labeling for twenty-eight 
products, including a number of soy products, many corn products, and unprocessed 
6 
tomatoes and potatoes. Products do not have to be labeled if the GM content is less than five 
percent, but could voluntarily be labeled as GM if the producer chooses (this would be 
unlikely). For products that are labeled, producers must label the product as "genetically 
modified," "inseparable," or "no GMOs present" (Bernauer, 2001). 
While Japan has allowed many GM products to be approved, it is strict in dealing 
with unapproved GM foods. Changes to Japan's Food Sanitation Law now make it illegal to 
either sell or import GM foods that have not been approved, or inspected. In June 2001, 
there were three recalls of food products that tested positive for unapproved GM foods (Hur). 
Despite the new Japanese policy, Americans remain hopeful that trade with Japan will 
continue to run smoothly. U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman said she was "hopeful 
there will be no disruption of trade" between the two countries (AgBiotech Reporter, May 
2001). This appears to be the case, as Japanese approved a plan to label processed potatoes 
(and allow them on the maricet). GM potato chips not approved for consumption caused 
many of the recalls. 
Canada currently only requires labeling for GM foods if those foods have health or 
safety issues. At the Codex-Alimentarius Meetings in May of2001, Canadian government 
officials reiterated their position but also talked of compromises in order to make trade 
easier. Margaret Kenny from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency said, "Canada supports 
mandatory labeling for health and safety matters." She also said, "we're also very supportive 
of the need for uniform international standard. We're certainly hopeful at this meeting 
there's going to be some ideas on the table, where we can talk about getting the best of both 
proposals" (CBC News, 2001). In late 2001, Canada's House of Commons rejected a bill 
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that would have required mandatory labeling of GM foods by a vote of 126-91 (AgBiotech 
Reporter, November 2001). 
Up until early 2001, China supported biotechnology. Many thought that China was 
more supportive of biotechnological crops than any other country, except the U.S. In 2001, 
China's policy towards GM foods became more reserved. First, China banned GM rice, 
wheat, maize, tomato, cotton, and soybeans (AgBiotech Reporter, May 2001). China did this 
to avoid having their crops banned from other nations, according to Chen Zhangliang, Vice 
President of Peking University. 
On May 23, 2001, China issued a new, 56-article regulation policy on biotechnology. 
This article aimed at strengthening control over all aspects of agricultural biotechnology. A 
report by the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service stated that "the regulation is vaguely worded, 
leaving a great deal to the discretion of the department responsible for drafting and enforcing 
the implementing regulations." The report goes on to say that there will be safety 
certification for all GM food, and all GM foods will have to be labeled (AgBiotech Reporter, 
July 2001). 
China issued a new regulation on June 6,2001 on the management of agricultural 
GMOs which requires safety certification and labeling of all GM foods. A senior Chinese 
official stated that GM crops would not be banned (AgBiotech Reporter, October 2001). 
China's ascension into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the threat of complaints 
before the WTO did not keep the Chinese from enacting biotechnology trade barriers. In 
early 2002, China used whatever means they could to implement trade barriers against GM 
foods (AgBiotech Reporter, February 2002). 
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Many other countries also have GM-labeling policies. These policies vary from the 
type of wording needed on the label to the amount of genetically modified material that will 
be tolerated in the product before a label of "genetically modified" is mandatory. For 
example, Korea allows a 3% tolerance of genetically modified material while Brazil allows a 
4% tolerance. Thailand actually has different tolerance levels for different products. They 
allow a 5% tolerance for soybeans, but only a 3% tolerance for com (Shipman, 2001). 
1.2.3. Why do Different Countries have Different Policies? 
Different countries have different experiences regarding food and food safety. 
Because of these experiences it should not be surprising that countries have developed 
different policies to deal with GM foods. There are four main reasons why countries and 
individuals could oppose GM foods. There are ethical reasons, environmental concerns, 
human health concerns, or worries about trading with other countries. Different countries 
emphasize different concerns, which causes different policies. 
Europeans are more likely than Americans (and the rest of the world) to oppose GM 
foods on ethical grounds. Among those who oppose GM foods for ethical reasons is Prince 
Charles, who has said that God is the only one who should be allowed to genetically engineer 
food. Europeans are also more likely to avoid GM foods due to environmental concerns. 
Environmental groups have significant power in European politics, and the biggest 
environmental groups have expressed their opposition to GM foods (Friends of the Earth 
2001, Greenpeace, 2001). 
The safety of GM foods is a major concern for many countries. Australia, China and 
Japan are requiring labeling of GM foods to allow consumers to decide whether or not they 
wish to consume genetically engineered foods. This indicates that these countries are 
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worried about health issues. European consumers are also worried about the safety of GM 
foods. Many human safety scandals have arisen recently in Europe where the governments 
did not do a good job, including the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis, the 
HIV/AIDS tainted blood scandal in France, and the dioxin scandal in Belgium. These issues, 
and the recent foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, have caused Europeans to distrust 
regulators. Now, when scientists and regulators try to assure the European public that GM 
foods are safe, many Europeans have doubts. The Starlink controversy, where GM com that 
was unapproved for human consumption got into the food supply, added to the European's 
GM food safety concerns. 
China has issues with GM crops in large part because they are afraid that they may 
lose Europe as an export market. While there are individual farmers who have decided to go 
GM-free to enhance trade possibilities, it seems unusual that a whole country would ban 
planting of GM crops due to export worries. Ascension to the World Trade Organization did 
not keep China from implementing their barriers on GM foods. 
Canada has approximately the same standards as the U.S., which seems logical due to 
the close proximity of the two countries, and NAFTA allowing products to flow freely from 
the U.S. to Canada and vice versa. Both Canada and the U.S. view potential threats from 
genetic modification as minor compared to the potential rewards. 
The United States' policies towards GM foods are far less stringent than the standards 
in Europe and most of the rest of the world. What is odd is that the U.S. has had far stricter 
standards than Europe in areas of food safety and environmental protection in the past. It is 
only a recent occurrence that Europe is catching up to the U.S. in terms of safety regulations, 
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and Europe still has more lenient regulations than the U.S. does for many things (Vogel, 
2001). 
1.2.4. Benefits and Costs of Food Labels 
Many have shown that there could be benefits from mandatory labeling of GM foods. 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth both advocate labels on GM foods to give consumers 
the right to choose whether or not to consume GM foods. Many environmental and 
consumer advocacy groups call for mandatory labeling, which they believe benefits 
consumers (Greenpeace 2001, Friends of the Earth, 2001). 
The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, has 
analyzed the potential benefits of labels on foods (Golan et al, 2000). One benefit is making 
it easy to find information, e.g. on nutritional content of foods. Thus, labeling of foods can 
lead to more informed choices on food and health by consumers. Also, some firms may want 
to avoid the prospect of placing a label that has negative connotations, and required labeling 
could lead them to improve their product. 
Caswell and Padberg (1992) recommended a more comprehensive view of the 
benefits of labels on food products. These benefits can be above and beyond what are 
normally considered the typical benefits from labels. The benefits from food labels include 
increased consumer information, improved product design, and more consumer confidence in 
product quality. Also, labels can provide an option value, even for consumers who do 
currently read food labels. This option value exists because if a food is labeled, consumers 
always have the option to view the label, either now or in the future, and that option has some 
value. 
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While there might be benefits, implementing a labeling policy could be quite costly. 
Biotechnology firms oppose mandatory labeling for all GM foods because they do not think 
foods should be specially labeled unless the food is different from the conventional product 
(Council for Biotechnology Information, 2001). The United States Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service listed many costs associated with implementing a 
labeling policy. If a mandatory labeling policy on genetically modified foods were enacted, 
significant costs would be incurred. Identity preservation, to determine whether a particular 
food is GM, has significant fixed costs. When separating GM from non-GM foods, mistakes 
in delivery of the product are always a possibility. In the United States, GM corn that was 
not approved for human consumption, known as S tar link corn, got into the U.S. food system. 
Another possible cost is accidental contamination of non-GM crops by their GM counterpart. 
Farmers have to go to great lengths to ensure that non-GM crops are not contaminated with 
the GM variety. Among the things farmers need to do to ensure there is no contamination is 
to have buffer zones, that is zones between the GM and non-GM crops to prevent 
contamination. Farmers also need to make sure planting and harvesting equipment are not 
contaminated with any residue from GM crops. All of these items imply real costs when a 
labeling policy is implemented. 
These added labeling and storage costs would lead to higher prices for consumers 
(and possibly lower prices to producers). The higher prices would affect all consumers, and 
therefore would be like a regressive tax, because the poor spend a larger share of their 
income for food than do high-income households. In addition to the poor having to pay for 
labeled food, the poor and less educated are less likely to benefit from food labels. This 
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leads to what the USD A labeled, a "reverse Robin Hood effect" of taking money from the 
poor to benefit the rich. 
The USDA suggests that labeling could change an industry's structure. With some 
fixed costs associated with labeling, small firms may have higher per unit labeling costs than 
large firms. This would mean increasing returns to scale, and an incentive for firms to get 
bigger, or close down. A labeling policy that decreases the number of firms could decrease 
competition and might increase prices for consumers. Another cost firms could face is 
reformulation costs, which could be quite high. 
The USDA suggests that adding more information to food labels dilutes the other 
information given on the label. This concern seems most important when the labeling policy 
being considered would inform consumers of an attribute that may not impact human health, 
e.g. genetic modification. Labeling without independent verification is not likely to be 
useful. Hence, a new labeling policy would require resources for government or third-party 
verification. 
There are relatively few estimates of the costs due to labeling of GM foods. The 
accounting/consulting firm KPMG was commissioned for a study in Australia and New 
Zealand to examine the costs of complying with a new labeling law. They estimated that the 
costs of the labeling laws could mean an increase in consumer prices from 0.5% to 15%, and 
that firms could also face lower profits (Phillips and Foster, 2000). Phillips and Smyth 
(2000) estimated that a voluntary identity preserved production and marketing system in 
Canada cost from 13-15% during 1995-1996. The Philippine Chamber of Food 
Manufacturers warned that mandatory GM food labels would increase production costs by 
15%, and that the increased costs would be passed on to consumers (AgBiotech Reporter, 
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August 2001). One thing seems apparent; implementing a labeling policy on genetically 
modified foods is costly, even if the exact magnitude of the costs is unknown. 
1.2.5. The Impact of Information from Interested Parties 
With many different sources giving information to consumers, what are consumers 
likely to do? Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have shown that if decision makers are 
strategically sophisticated, and are well informed of the interested parties' preferences, they 
can arrive at the correct conclusion about a good. Genetic modification is a complex process, 
which involves taking genes from one product and placing them into another product. Most 
people do not know the intricate details of this process and many people do not know the 
underlying preferences of the interested parties. 
Viscusi (1997) studied consumer reaction to environmental risks. He showed that 
when consumers receive divergent information on environmental risks, they tend to put a 
greater weight on the high-risk assessment. The individual's reaction was similar for 
information from both government and industry sources of information. 
Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2001) examined the effects of positive and negative 
information on the willingness to pay for irradiated pork sandwiches. They found that when 
consumers were presented with both positive and negative information on food irradiation, 
the negative information dominated their decision making. This was despite the fact that the 
negative information was presented by a consumer advocacy group and was presented in a 
non-scientific manner. 
1.2.6. Information from Third Parties 
Recent research has shown that there may be a need for third party, verifiable 
information on GM foods, so consumers would not have to rely on the information from 
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biotechnology companies and environmental groups (Huffman and Tegene, 2002). They 
hypothesized that such a third party group could be welfare improving. Recent research on 
organic foods reached a similar conclusion, in that there may be benefits from a third party 
monitor to help reduce false claims by interested parties (McClusky, 2000). 
1.2.7. The Value of Information 
Foster and Just (1989) determined a way to value information that is given to 
consumers. They examined the heptachlor crisis in Hawaii, which drastically reduced milk 
consumption. They derived a model where consumers were acting optimally given all of the 
information available to them, but they did not have the information on the milk 
contamination. Foster and Just then examined how consumer behavior changed once they 
received the new information and calculated the cost of consumers' ignorance. This cost of 
ignorance can be equivalently thought of as the value of information. The value of 
information was computed by comparing the ex post utilities (when the consumer was acting 
optimally and when the consumer was unknowingly purchasing a bundle they would not 
have purchased had the consumer been given all relevant information). For this case, 
consumers were not informed about the milk contamination and continued buying milk. 
However, many of these consumers would have needed a payment to consume milk if they 
had known about the contamination. Foster and Just found that the cost of ignorance (value 
of information) was almost $10.00 per month, per person. 
Teisl, Bockstael, and Levy (2001) used the same model to estimate the value of 
information on nutritional labels. They found that household's valued the nutritional 
information, on average, from $0,096 to $0,542 per product each month. Like the Foster and 
Just study, consumers were always acting in their best interest given the information 
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available, but there was some information that consumers did not have prior to the nutritional 
labels. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Introduction 
These experiments are designed to incorporate the private-information-revealing 
feature of experimental auction markets and the rigorous randomized treatment design of 
statistical experimental design (see for example Hoffman et al. 1993, Fox et al. 1998, 
Shogren et al. 2000, Lusk et al. 2001B).1 This set of experimental auctions had consumers 
bidding on actual foods that differed only by the presence or absence of a food label that 
indicated whether or not a food was genetically modified. 
Each experimental unit consisted of 13 to 16 consumers drawn from the households 
of two major urban areas and who were paid to participate. Using randomly chosen 
consumers from the population of an urban area, rather than undergraduate college students 
at a university, is seen as an advantage when it comes to making inferences, however 
cautious, from the experiments to the Midwest or whole U.S. population (also see the 
comments in Lusk et al. 2001B). Conducting experiments in two urban areas rather than 
one is also seen as enhancing credibility of our results by showing that the experiments can 
be replicated across urban areas. 
In this chapter, I will describe the food products, the auction mechanism, and the 
general description of the experimental units. I will also discuss the steps in the experiment. 
The steps in the experiment that are discussed are the exact steps involved in the experiment 
in chapters 4 and 6. For the experiments described in chapters 3 and 5, a supplemental 
section will describe how the experiments in those chapters differ from the general 
experimental design. Chapter 7 does not analyze results from the experiment itself, but the 
survey given before and after the experiment. 
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2.2. The Food Products 
It was anticipated that consumers might react differently to GM content for foods of different 
types. Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, three food 
items were used: vegetable oil, tortilla chips (made from yellow corn), and Russet potatoes. 
In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the proteins (which 
are the components ofDNA and source of genetic modification) are removed leaving pure 
lipids. Minimal human health concerns should arise from consumption of the oil, but people 
might still fear that genetically modified foods could harm the natural environment Tortilla 
chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-GM com, and 
consumers might have human health or environmental concerns or both. Russet potatoes are 
purchased as a fresh product and generally baked or fried before eating. Consumers might 
reasonably see the potential concentration of genetic modification as being higher in potatoes 
than in processed corn chips. Consumers might see both human health and environmental 
risks from eating Russet potatoes. Also, using three items allows for the determination of a 
consumer's taste for genetic modification even if they have no demand for one of the 
particular products. For example, if a consumer does not like potatoes, their preference 
towards genetic modification can still be elicited if they have a positive demand for either 
tortilla chips or vegetable oil. 
2.3. The Random nth-price Auction 
Valuation experiments use an auction mechanism to induce people to reveal their 
preferences for new goods and services (e.g., see Shogren et al. 1994, Fox et al. 1998, and 
Shogren et al. 2000). In particular, Vickery's (1961) sealed bid, second-price auction has 
been a popular mechanism. The popularity of the second-price auction mechanism is largely 
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due to it being demand revealing in theory, being relatively simple to explain, and having an 
endogenous market-clearing price. Also, evidence from induced value experiments suggests 
the auction mechanism can produce efficient outcomes in the aggregate (Kagel 1995). 
The second-price auction, however, has problems in that it does not accurately reveal 
the complete demand curve for a good by all participants. Individuals who anticipate being 
off the margin, i.e., bidders whose value for a good is far below or above the market-clearing 
price, frequently bid insincerely. This is because if a consumer perceives no realistic chance 
of winning, they can change their bid slightly with no repercussions. A second-price auction 
might not engage low-value bidders who think they will never lose by insincere bidding, and 
laboratory evidence by Miller and Plott (1985) and by Franciosi et al. (1993) supports this 
conjecture, i.e., off-the-margin bidders often do not reveal their lab-induced private values. 
Insincere bidding can be sustained if the behavior is undetected and unpunished by the 
institutional structure of the auction mechanism (e.g., see Cherry et al. 2002). 
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is also demand revealing in theory 
(Becker et al. 1964). It requires all auction participants to bid for the product in the auction, 
and consumers will win if their bid price is higher then a predetermined price that is not 
known to the consumer. If the consumer's bid price is higher then the predetermined price, 
the consumer will purchase the product for the predetermined price. If the consumer's bid 
price is lower than the predetermined price; they do not purchase the product This method 
has the advantage of a random pricing method. Unfortunately, the predetermined price could 
be such that no one wins the auction. 
The random nth-price auction is chosen for these GM-food experiments because it is 
designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin bidders (see Shogren et al. 2001). The 
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auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms: the Vickrey 
auction and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) random pricing mechanism. The key 
characteristic of the random nth price auction is a random but endogenously determined 
market-clearing price. Randomness is used to give all participants a positive probability of 
being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the endogenous price guarantees that the market-
clearing price is related to the bidders' private values. 
The random nth-price works as follows. Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit 
of a good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest The auction monitor 
then selects a random number—the n in the nth-price auction, which is drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 2 and k, and the auction monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the 
n-1 highest bidders at the nth-price. For instance, if the monitor randomly selects n = 4, the 
three highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced at the fourth-highest bid. Ex 
ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations now have a nontrivial chance to buy the 
good because the price is determined randomly. This auction increases the probability that 
insincere bidding will be costly (Shogren et al. 2001). 
2.4. The Participants 
Auctions were planned and conducted at two Midwestern U.S. cities, Des Moines, 
LA, and St. Paul, MN. Participants in the auctions were consumers that the Iowa State 
University Statistics Laboratory contacted and obtained agreement to participate. The 
Statistics Laboratory randomly selected residence telephone numbers from each of the 
metropolitan areas. Individuals reached by the statistics laboratory were told that Iowa State 
University was looking for people who were willing to participate in a group session in Des 
Moines (St Paul) that related to how people select food and household products. The 
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sessions were held in April and December 2001. People were informed that the sessions 
would last about 90 minutes. They were also told that at the end of the session each 
participant would receive $40 in cash for their time. The sessions were held at the Iowa State 
University Learning Connection, 7th and Locust Street, Des Moines (and the lower level of 
the Classroom Office Building, University of Minnesota, St. Paul). Different times were 
available each auction day, 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm, and willing participants were asked to 
choose a time that best fit their schedule. Two treatments were run at each time slot, and the 
treatments were randomly assigned to a time slot without replacement. Participation per 
household was limited to two adult individuals, and they were assigned to different groups.3 
To willing participants, the Statistics Laboratory followed up by sending a letter containing 
more information, including a map and instructions on when and where the meeting would 
be held, directions for getting there, and a telephone number to contact for more information. 
The phone numbers were called by employees of the ISU Statistics Laboratory to 
make sure that it was an eligible number, i.e., one with household members greater than 18 
years of age.2 Some telephone numbers were invalid, some numbers were valid but nobody 
was home, some numbers were valid but the individual did not want to participate, and some 
people agreed to participate. Among eligible households reached, 21 percent agreed to 
participate and 90 percent of these people actually showed up. Hence, there was a response 
rate of 19 percent. There were a total of 22 experimental units, and 318 participants. 
Table 2.7.1. summarizes the demographic characteristics of the 318 auction 
participants. To compare the demographic characteristics of the auction participants with the 
demographic characteristics of the area, a table in the appendix has the demographics of the 
Polk and Ramsey county areas (the counties Des Moines and St. Paul are in). This 
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information is taken from the 2000 U.S. Census (U S. Census, 2002). The individual 
demographics of each county are presented, and then a weighted average is taken to compare 
with our auction participants, with a weight of 16/22 on Polk County and 6/22 on Ramsey 
Country, since 16 of the 22 experimental units were in Des Moines. This weighted average 
is what one would expect for the demographic characteristics of our sample. 
Sixty-two percent of the participants in the auctions were female. This is slightly 
higher than the number of females in the two areas. The median age of a participant was 48 
years, which is similar to the median age of 45.7 years for individuals 20 or older in the two 
areas. Two-thirds of the auction participants were married - this is higher than the number of 
married people in the two areas (57.3). On average, the participants were well educated, with 
the mean education level being more than two years in college. This compares favorably 
with the two areas, as the mean schooling is almost 2 years of college in the general 
population of these two areas. The participants had a median total household income (before 
taxes) of almost $45,000 - this is similar to the median household income of $46,000 in the 
areas. Most of the participants in the experiments were white (ninety-three percent), a 
slightly higher percentage than the general population (87%). Most people indicated that 
they read labels before they buy a new food product Participants were asked how informed 
they thought they were about genetically modified foods. Forty-eight percent of the auction 
participants thought that they were at least somewhat informed about GM foods. Even 
though the people were solicited randomly and getting an accurate representation of the 
demographic characteristics of the area was not a goal, the demographic characteristics of our 
participants indicate that our experiments had a representative sample of the Midwest region 
of the United States.4 
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More demographic characteristics are presented in tables 2.7.2-2.7.4. Individuals 
were asked to indicate their religious upbringing. These results are reported in table 2.7.2. 
Fifteen percent of the participants were raised as Baptists. Slightly more than twenty-six 
percent of participants were raised as Catholics. Over seventeen percent of the participants 
were raised as Lutherans and almost sixteen percent as Methodists. Almost twenty percent 
indicated they were raised with a different religious upbringing, while almost six percent 
were not raised with any religious upbringing. 
Table 2.7.3. reports results from a question asked in the survey: "How many people 
do you think get sick from genetically modified foods each year in the United States? (note: 
there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.)" The mean perceived number of 
illnesses annually due to GM foods is over 14.5 million. This number is extremely large, and 
much larger than the median, due to a handful of people who thought that everybody (or 
almost everybody) in the United States would get ill because of GM foods. The median 
number of perceived illnesses annually due to GM foods was almost twenty-four thousand. 
Twenty-five percent of the participants thought that fewer than one hundred people get sick 
annually in the U.S. because of GM foods. What is interesting about these responses is that 
there has never been a confirmed case of an individual getting sick from GM foods - yet 
many perceived large numbers of people getting sick annually. 
Table 2.7.4. reports on the highest education level the participants attained. Six 
percent of the participants did not complete high school; fewer than nineteen percent of the 
participants did complete high school, but did not attend college. Almost thirty-five percent 
of the participants attended college but did not get a four-year degree. Just over twenty 
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percent of the participants attained a four-year college degree, and about nineteen percent of 
the participants completed at least some graduate school work. 
2.5. Steps in the Experiment 
Figure 2.7.5. shows a graphical representation of the steps in this experiment. In step 
1 when participants arrived at the experiment, they signed a consent form agreeing to 
participate in the auction. After they signed this form, they were given $40 for participating 
and an ID number to preserve the participants' anonymity. The participants then read brief 
instructions and filled out a questionnaire. 
In step 2, participants were given detailed instructions about how the random nth-
price auction works, including an example written on the blackboard. After the participants 
learned about the auction, a short quiz was given to participants to ensure that everyone 
understood how the auction worked. The packet that was given to auction participants 
(specifically the packet used for the experiments described in chapter 4 and 6) is in the 
appendix. 
Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, in which participants bid on a brand-
name candy bar. The participants were all asked to examine the product, and then place a bid 
on the candy bar. The bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding was over. 
Throughout the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a round, they had no 
indication of what other items they may be bidding on in future rounds. 
Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding, and in this round the participants bid 
separately on three different items. The products were the same brand-name candy bar, a 
deck of playing cards, and a box of pens. Participants knew that only one of the two rounds 
would be chosen at random to be binding, which prevented anyone from taking home more 
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than one unit of any product. This random binding round eliminates the threat of demand 
reduction due to potentially buying more than one unit (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000)/ 
The consumers first examined the three products and then submitted their bids. 
After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the 
binding nth-prices were revealed in step 5. All bid prices were written on the blackboard, 
and the nth-price was circled for each of the three products. Participants could see 
immediately what items they won, and the price they would pay. The participants were told 
that the exchange of money for goods was in another room nearby, and would take place 
after the entire experiment was completed. 
In step 6, participants received one of six potential info-packets that provided non­
food-label information about biotechnology. These info-packets were produced as follows. 
Three information sources were created: (1) the industry perspective—a collection of 
statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading 
biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental group 
perspective—a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group; and (3) the independent, third party 
perspective—a statement on genetic modification approved by a third party group, consisting 
of a variety of people knowledgeable about genetically modified goods, including scientists, 
professionals, religious leaders, and academics, who do not have a financial stake in 
genetically modified foods. This information is called verifiable information since the third 
party group is only reporting verifiable information to the participants. Each information 
source was limited to one full page, organized into five categories: general information, 
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scientific impact, human impact, financial impact, and environmental impact. The exact 
format and wording of the three information sources can be found in the appendix. 
These information sources were then randomized to create the six info-packets: (1) 
pro-biotechnology, (2) anti-biotechnology, (3) both pro and anti-biotechnology,6 (4) pro-
biotechnology and independent, verifiable,7 (5) anti-biotechnology and independent, 
verifiable, and (6) pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and independent verifiable. These 
info-packets were then randomized among the experimental units. 
Once the appropriate info-packet was distributed to the participants in a given unit, 
two auction rounds were then conducted. The rounds were differentiated by the food label 
— either the food had a standard food label or a GM-label, as shown in Figure 2.7.6. In one 
round (which could be round 1 or 2 depending on experimental unit),8 participants were 
bidding on the three food products each with the standard food label. We made these labels 
as plain as possible to avoid any influence on the bids from the label design. In the other 
round, participants were bidding on the same three food products with a GM-label, which 
differed from the standard label by the inclusion of only one extra sentence: "This product is 
made using genetic modification (GM)." We constructed the GM-labels to comply with the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations of GM-food labels. For each experimental 
unit, participants knew that only one round would be chosen as the binding round that 
determined auction winners. 
In step 7, participants bid on three different food products: a bag of potatoes, a bottle 
of vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla chips, either with the standard or GM-label. The 
participants were instructed to examine the three products, and then to write down their 
sealed bid for each of the three goods. Participants bid on each good separately. The 
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monitor then collected the bids from the people, and then told them they were next going to 
look at another group of food items. 
Step 8 had participants examine the same three food products, each with a different 
label from round 1. Again the participants examined the products, and bid on the three 
products separately. The bids were then collected from all of the individuals. 
Step 9 selected the binding round, and the binding random nth-prices for the three 
goods. Winners were notified. In step 10, each participant was asked to complete a brief 
post-auction questionnaire, then the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win. 




1. Philip Dixon and Wayne Fuller, Department of Statistics, Iowa State University, provided 
assistance with the statistical design part of the project 
2. In addition to a participant's age, the Statistics Laboratory also asked for gender. 
3. When two adults in a household participated, the Statistics Laboratory talked separately 
to them to obtain a commitment to participate, and they were told that they would be 
assigned to different groups. 
4. Demographic information for both the St Paul area (Ramsey County) and the city of Des 
Moines (Polk County) can be found at www.census.gov. 
5. If one assumes that there is little or no income effect from the deck of cards and box of 
pens, the two bids on the candy bar should be the same. The reason is that because the 
deck of cards and box of pens are neither complements nor substitutes to the candy bar, 
they should not impact the bids on the candy bar. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
confirmed that the bids for the candy bars are not significantly different in the two 
rounds, with a test statistic of 0.03. This result does not contradict the notion that the 
subjects' bidding behavior was reasonable. 
6. When a participant received both pro-biotechnology and anti-biotechnology information, 
the order was randomized, so that some people got the pro-biotechnology information 
first, and some people got the anti-biotechnology information first. 
7. When verifiable information was distributed, monitors always distributed it after the 
other information sources. 
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8. I randomized the sequencing of the standard food and GM-labels across experimental 
units. One unit had the standard label in round 1, and GM-label in round 2. The second 
unit had the GM-label in round 1 and the standard label in round 2. 
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2.7. Tables and Figures 
2.7.1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants 
N=318 
Variable Definition 
Gender 1 if female 
Age The participant's age 
Mairied 1 if the individual is married 
Education Years of schooling 
Household Number of people in participant's household 
Income The households income level (in thousands) 
White 1 if participant is white 
Read L 1 if never reads labels before a new food 
purchase 
1 if rarely reads labels 
1 if sometimes reads labels 
1 if often reads labels 
1 if always reads labels 
Informed 1 if an individual considered themselves at 
least somewhat informed regarding genetically 
modified foods 
Labels 1 1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels 



























in round 1 
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Table 2.7.2. Religious upbringing of individuals in the survey 
N=318 







Table 2.7.3. Perceived number of illnesses due to GM-foods 







Perceived number of people who 







Table 2.7.4. Education of individuals in the survey 
N=318 
Highest level of schooling completed Percent 
Did not complete high school 6.0 
Completed high school 18.6 
Attended some college 22.6 
Two-year college degree 12.3 
Four-year college degree 21.4 
Some graduate college work 19.2 
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Binding practice round 
and binding nth prices 
are revealed 
Step 7 
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Step 8 
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on food products 
Step 9 
Binding food round 





people purchase goods 
Figure 2.7.5. Steps in the experiment 
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Russet Potatoes 
Net weight 5 lb. 
This product is made using 
genetic modification (GM) 
Russet Potatoes 
Net weight 5 lb. 
Tortilla Chips 
Net weight 16 oz. 
Fresh made Thursday April 5th 
This product is made using 
genetic modification (GM) 
Tortilla Chips 
Net weight 16 oz. 
Fresh made Thursday April 5,h 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 fl. oz. 
This product is made using 
genetically modified (GM) soybeans 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 fl. oz. 
Figure 2.7.6. Labels usedfor the three food items 
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CHAPTER 3: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES INITIATE A MANDATORY 
LABELING POLICY FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS? 
3.1. Introduction 
Public debate continues over whether the United States should impose a mandatory 
labeling policy for genetically modified (GM) foods. Favoring a mandatory labeling policy 
for GM foods are such groups as Greenpeace (1997), Friends of the Earth (2001), and 
Consumer Reports (1999). Opposing a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods are the 
Council for Biotechnology information (2001) and the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (2001). This is a contentious issue, engaging debate from all sides of the 
spectrum, yet there has been modest economic work done to examine the merits and pitfalls 
of a mandatory labeling policy for genetically modified foods in the United States. 
This paper examines the potential welfare effects imposed by a mandatory GM 
labeling policy in the United States. I first show that mandatory labeling policy for GM 
foods results in welfare losses relative to a voluntary labeling policy—assuming consumers 
understand perfectly the signals sent in each market Then an experimental auction is 
designed to test the critical presumption that consumers do indeed interpret the market 
signals identically. For a sample of likely consumers living in two major Midwest cities, the 
results support the assumption that people can interpret voluntary and mandatory market 
signals identically. These findings do not reject the view that it would be more efficient if 
the US continued its voluntary labeling policy and resisted calls for mandatory labeling of 
genetically modified foods. 
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3.2. Empirical Model 
3.2.1. Basic Framework 
I develop a single period model to examine the welfare effects of alternative labeling 
policies. Following the model of food certification in Crespi and Marette (2001) and the 
model on GM-labeling by Krichhoff and Zago (2001), the model compares the welfare of a 
mandatory GM-labeling policy to the welfare of a voluntary GM-labeling policy. Assume a 
firm produces one of two products, GM food or non-GM food. Without loss of generality, 
assume a firm could produce the GM food at marginal cost of zero, while the marginal cost 
of non-GM food is c > q • There are also laboratory costs to test for GM content. Assume 
firms that have a product tested to determine the genetically modified status of their product 
incur a marginal cost of / > o • 
Assume firms know whether their products are genetically modified. Suppose a 
sufficient number of firms exist such that when proper signals are available, many firms 
would be producing GM foods and many firms would be producing non-GM foods. Firms 
compete by Bertrand competition (by setting prices) so to examine the welfare effects of 
different labeling policies, one needs only look at the gains to consumers. This is because 
under Bertrand competition, firms earn zero profits so they are indifferent to labeling 
policies. 
All consumers have a value />0 for a food product (GM or non-GM). This could 
be thought of as the value consumers place on not starving. In addition, tastes for non-GM 
foods are assumed to be uniformly distributed across consumers, denoted by q g [p,l] • For 
consumers who buy non-GM foods at a price of pNGU, their indirect utility is 0 + f- pmM • 
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For consumers who buy GM foods at a price of p , their indirect utility is f -pC M  - For 
ease of welfare analysis, simplify the mass of consumers to one. Assume no positive or 
negative externalities of one consumer on another.1 
Consider a baseline case where no labeling of products is allowed. Because non-GM 
foods are costlier than GM foods, only GM foods will be offered. GM foods will be offered 
at a price of zero, because Bertrand competition brings price down to marginal cost The 
reason there is no non-GM food when labeling is banned is that no way exists for consumers 
to distinguish between GM and non-GM foods. A premium cannot be charged for non-GM 
foods, which is needed to cover the higher costs of producing non-GM foods. A consumer's 
total surplus is y. This outcome occurs because a separating equilibrium is unavailable, and 
non-GM foods can not be accurately signaled, leading to the classic "lemons" problem 
(Akerlof, 1970). This problem could also occur in a voluntary labeling regime if testing 
costs are too high. I next consider the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies: a 
mandatory GM-labeling policy where all food products must be tested and a voluntary 
labeling policy, where firms wishing to label their products as non-GM must have their 
products tested. All cases assume the regulator incurs a per unit cost for certification and 
passes that cost onto firms: a discussion of fixed certification costs follows this analysis. 
3.2.2. A Mandatory Labeling Policy 
Consider a mandatory GM labeling policy where all food products must be tested to 
determine if they are genetically modified. Foods that are genetically modified will be 
labeled as "genetically modified." Foods that are not genetically modified will not be labeled 
(although labeling these products as non-GM does not change the analysis). A GM product 
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has a constant marginal cost (and price) of /, and a non-GM product has a marginal cost (and 
price) of c+t -2 The consumer surplus of individual j who purchases non-GM foods is: 
0)  CS J  =0 J  +f-p-
The consumer surplus for all consumers who purchase non-GM foods is then: 
(2 )  CS N ™ = f (0+f -p)d0  = j (û+f -C- t )dO 
O f f L  & U L  
(2A) CSff" 
Where is the value of q where consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM 
and GM foods under a mandatory labeling policy. Consumer surplus for individual j who 
purchases GM foods is: 
(3) C S J = f - p -
Aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is: 
<4A> cs%=](f-P)de= ]{f-t)de 
o o 
<4B> CS% 
3.2.3. A Voluntary Labeling Policy 
Consider a voluntary labeling policy, where only the products that are to be labeled as 
non-GM need to be tested. Non-GM products are labeled as non-GM. GM products are not 
labeled, and consumers will see this as a signal that these foods are GM. Once again, the 
marginal cost of testing a product is / > o • Now a GM product has a price of 0, while a non-
GM product has the same price of c+t. Consumer surplus of an individual who purchases 
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non-GM foods is the same under either policy, as shown in equation (1). Aggregate 
consumer surplus of those who will purchase non-GM foods is: 
(5) CS™M = )(0+f-p)d0= {(<9+f -C-t)iO 
(5A) CS™ =(!-%% /-C-/j 
is the value of g when consumers are indifferent between consuming non-GM and GM 
foods under a mandatory labeling policy. Consumer surplus for individual j who purchases 
GM foods under a voluntary policy is: 
(6) C S j  = f - p  =  f -
Therefore aggregate consumer surplus of those who purchase GM foods is: 
(7) cs% ="](f)de=eK*f-
0 
Consider a third possible labeling policy, where genetically modified products must 
be labeled as such, and non-GM products are not labeled. For this policy, however, only 
those products wanting to avoid the label of "genetically modified" need to be tested. Firms 
that do not test will be forced to label their foods as genetically modified. Once again, the 
marginal cost of testing a product is t > 0 • For this case, a GM product will have a price of 
0, while a non-GM product has a price of t + a- This alternative mandatory labeling policy 
gives the same welfare as the voluntary labeling policy. 
One can state that consumer welfare is greater under the voluntary labeling policy. If 
one considers only consumers and firms in a model (and not third party groups), then a 
voluntary labeling policy for GM foods Pareto dominates a mandatory labeling policy. This 
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is because voluntary and mandatory labeling policies send the same signal, but additional 
testing and segregation costs occur under a mandatory policy. This model only assumed that 
food testing would imply a higher marginal cost, when other costs of a mandatory labeling 
policy are also considered, such as a possible increase in market concentration, mistakes in 
labeling, and dilution of the other information on the food label (Golan et al. 2000), it 
strengthens the prediction that a voluntary labeling policy yields higher welfare than a 
mandatory policy. 
In a market structure where firms compete by quantity (Coumot model), one gets the 
same result if the number of firms producing GM foods and non-GM foods stays the same 
when a switch is made from a voluntary policy to a mandatory policy. A change from a 
voluntary to a mandatory labeling policy has no effect for an individual who consumes non-
GM foods and a decrease in welfare for those who consume GM-foods. Under the Coumot 
model however, firms that produced GM-foods would earn lower profits under the 
mandatory policy. The result that a voluntary labeling policy yields higher welfare than a 
mandatory labeling policy is robust to the type of model used to analyze the problem. 
Where the regulator incurs a fixed cost for testing in a mandatory labeling policy, and 
passes the cost along to producers, passing it along as a fixed user fee is always less efficient 
than passing the costs along as a per-unit user fee (Crespi and Marette, 2001). Therefore, an 
efficient certification process will result in the regulator splitting the fixed cost into per-unit 
user fees, and the analysis for the per-unit certification cost applies. 
Many environmental groups are calling for a mandatory labeling policy on GM foods 
(Greenpeace 1997, Friends of the Earth, 2001). This is despite the fact that consumers could 
purchase non-GM foods under a voluntary labeling policy by looking for foods with a non-
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GM label on it. This model presents an explanation for this behavior. Suppose the utility of 
environmental groups is positively related to the number of individuals who consume non-
GM foods (and negatively related to the number of individuals who consume GM foods). A 
mandatory labeling policy imposes additional costs for testing on GM foods, and therefore 
increases the number of individuals who would purchase non-GM foods. The passage of a 
mandatory GM-labeling law would increase the utility of environmental groups. 
3.2.4. When will a Voluntary Labeling Policy not Allow for Signals? 
When testing to see if a product is made using genetic modification, no one will 
c o nsume non-GM foods if the test is too costly. For any consumer that has #-C-f <0» be 
will not purchase the non-GM food, because he is better off buying the GM food and 
obtaining a consumer surplus of f So if the consumer who places the highest value on non-
GM food (5 = 1) finds it too costly to purchase non-GM foods, ( c+1 > 1X nobody will buy 
non-GM foods because the signal is too costly. 
This analysis implicitly assumes that consumers can distinguish the signal that a food 
is GM (or non-GM) equally well under different labeling regimes. This is a contentious 
point that many groups, including Greenpeace (1997) and Friends of the Earth (2001), 
strongly disagree with. These groups are calling for a mandatory labeling policy in the 
United States because, as Greenpeace (1997) puts it, "customers must have the right to 
know." I conduct experiment auctions to see if consumers behave as if they see the same 
signal under alternative labeling regimes or if consumers read the signals differently. A 
discussion of the experimental design and the differences from the experimental design 
described in chapter 2 follows. 
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3J. Experimental Design 
3.3.1. Differences from Experimental Design in Chapter 2 
The specific purpose of this experiment is to test whether consumer bidding behavior 
for GM and GM-free food is the same in two experimental markets—one within a mandatory 
labeling policy and one with a voluntary labeling policy. If bidding behavior for GM and 
GM-free food were similar across the two markets, the results would not contradict the thesis 
that consumers accurately read the signals in both markets. The empirical model suggested 
that a voluntary labeling is a more efficient policy - provided consumers accurately assess 
which food is genetically modified. If the behavior for GM foods differed across labeling 
regimes, one could reject the thesis that labeling is irrelevant to choice. Here a mandatory 
labeling might not necessarily lead to a welfare loss. But if bidding behavior for GM foods 
is independent of the labeling policy, one could not reject the implications of the empirical 
model - that a voluntary labeling policy is more efficient for consumers than a mandatory 
labeling policy. In this experiment, some consumers bid on foods with positive GM-labels— 
the labels that would arise in a mandatory labeling regime; others bid on food with negative 
GM-labels—the labels that would arise in a voluntary labeling regime.3 
The experimental design consisted of four biotech information-labeling treatments 
with each treatment replicated at least twice. One of the treatments was replicated four 
times, twice in April and twice in December. This allowed an examination of whether the 
bids were the same over time - which could not be rejected by t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests. These experimental units are summarized in table 3.7.1. The same three food 
items that were used in the experimental design that was described in chapter 2 are used here: 
vegetable oil,4 tortilla chips (made from yellow com), and Russet potatoes. 
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3.3.2. The Information/Labeling Treatments 
Participants received one of two potential info-packets that provided non-food-label 
information about biotechnology. These information sources were then randomized to 
create the two info-packets: (1) both pro and anti-biotechnology and (2) pro-biotechnology, 
anti-biotechnology, and independent verifiable. These info-packets were then randomized 
among all ten experimental units, with each info-packet going to five experimental units. By 
giving all participants both positive and negative information on GM foods, and by giving 
some participants a third-party perspective on GM foods, we are finding out the willingness 
to pay for individuals who have received all sides of the story on GM foods. Table 3.7.1. 
summarizes the 8 treatments. 
Once the appropriate info-packet was distributed to the participants in a given unit, 
two auction rounds were then conducted. The rounds were differentiated by the food label— 
either the food had a standard food label or a label that indicated the status of genetic 
modification, as shown for potatoes in Figure 3.7.2. In one round (which could be round 1 or 
2 depending on experimental unit), participants were bidding on the three food products each 
with the standard food label. We made these labels as plain as possible to avoid any 
influence on the bids from the label design. In the other round, participants were bidding on 
the same three food products with either a GM label or a non-GM label.5 The GM and non-
GM labels differed from the standard label only by the inclusion of only one extra sentence. 
The GM label said "This product is made using genetic modification," while the non-GM 
label said "This product is made without using genetic modification." For each experimental 
unit, participants knew that only one round would be chosen as the binding round that 
determined auction winners. 
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3.4. Results 
Table 3.7.3. shows the mean and median bids. Eighty-six participants were in 
treatments that bid on the plain-labeled and GM-labeled food products while fifty-six 
participants were in treatments that bid on the plain-labeled and non-GM labeled food 
products. For the participants who bid on the GM-labeled and plain-labeled foods, 
consumers discounted the GM-labeled oil by 11 cents, the GM-labeled chips by 8 cents and 
the GM-labeled potatoes by 8 cents. The participants who bid on the plain-labeled food and 
the non-GM food discounted the plain-labeled oil by 4 cents, the plain-labeled chips by 7 
cents and the plain-labeled potatoes by 9 cents. 
The main goal is to determine whether consumers can accurately decipher which food 
is GM irrespective of the labeling treatment. To determine whether consumers perceive the 
GM-signals differently in the two markets, I first examine the difference in bids for the 
perceived-GMproduct to the perceived-non-GMproduct. In the mandatory-labeling trials, 
the GM-labeled food is the perceived-GM product; the plain-labeled food is the perceived-
non-GM product. In the voluntary-labeling trials, the plain-labeled food is the perceived-GM 
product; the non-GM labeled food is the perceived-non-GM product. 
Table 3.7.4. presents results from a test of the null hypothesis that no difference in 
bids for the perceived-GM and the perceived-non-GM bids exist. For all three products, / 
reject the null hypothesis that consumers' bids for the perceived-GM and the perceived-non-
GM foods are equal. This result suggests that the average consumer bids less for the food 
that is signaled as genetically modified, which supports earlier finding reported by Lusk et 
al., 2001. 
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Table 3.7.5. presents results from tests of the null hypothesis that the bids for the 
perceived-GM and non-GM products are equal across the two treatments. Did consumers bid 
the same for the plain-labeled product in the GM-labeled treatment as they did for the non-
GM labeled product in the non-GM treatment? For each product, I test two separate null 
hypotheses: 
<*> H. : Bid™'JZZ = 
(9) Ha : BUZZ?*" = BUZZf • 
The null hypothesis in expression (8) tests the hypothesis that the bids for the perceived-GM 
foods are the same in either labeling treatment The superscripts indicate the type of food 
product; the subscript indicates the labeling treatment. The null hypothesis in expression (9) 
tests the hypothesis that the bids for the perceived-non-GM labeled foods are the same in 
both trials. Table 3.7.5. shows that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average 
bids are identical. This suggests that consumers act as if they accurately read the signals for 
which food is genetically modified under either a mandatory or a voluntary labeling regime. 
The size of the discount for the perceived-GM food provides additional evidence 
about consumers' perception of the signals from the two labeling regimes. Null hypotheses 
that consumers did not discount the perceived-GM food in the two markets differently were 
tested. Table 3.7.6. shows the results. The first column shows the difference in bids in the 
mandatory- labeling trials, the second column shows the difference in bids in the voluntary-
labeling trials. The third column is the difference between these columns. The absolute 
difference is 7 cents for vegetable oil; 1 cent for the tortilla chips; and 1 cent for the potatoes. 
At the five percent significance level, the tests show that one cannot reject the null hypothesis 
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that the difference in bids is zero for any of the three food products.6 While none of the 
differences are statistically significant, at first glance it is curious that the mean discount 
under positive or negative labels is virtually identical for the tortilla chips and potatoes, yet it 
is considerably larger for the vegetable oil. A possible explanation for the vegetable oil 
having a 7-cent difference is the fact that two different types of vegetable oils were used.7 
Consumers discounted the perceived GM food the same irrespective of whether the 
market had mandatory or voluntary GM-labeling. This result provides additional evidence 
that consumers receive the same signals either regime. By not rejecting the thesis that 
consumers know GM from non-GM food regardless of the labeling regimes, the results 
support the empirical analysis—less-expensive voluntary GM-labeling policy could yields 
greater overall welfare than a mandatory GM-labeling policy. Without speculating beyond 
the reach of the lab, this finding supports those who believe the United States has been 
prudent in avoiding calls to initiate a mandatory GM-labeling policy. 
3.5. Conclusion 
GM-food labeling remains an important and politically contentious issue in the US. 
Many groups call for mandatory labeling of GM foods, while many others want to keep 
labeling voluntary. This paper provides evidence, which supports the view that a voluntary 
labeling policy is more efficient than a mandatory labeling policy in the United States. The 
reason is that voluntary labeling policies are less expensive and still give consumers the 
choice to consume GM or non-GM foods. This result hinges on consumer's ability to read 
signals identically in either market, a conclusion that the auctions could not reject. One 
further avenue for research would be to examine the international dimension to GM food 
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labels, say in Europe or Australia. For example do they read the same signals of genetic 
modification in voluntary labeling markets as in mandatory labeling markets? The key issue 
is relevance and usefulness of the mandatory labeling policies throughout the world. 
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3.6. Notes 
1. There may also be fixed costs associated with testing food products for GM content, this 
model, however, is abstracting away from these costs. They would introduce non-
linearity into the decision process but would not alter the predictions of the model. 
2. This is where my model differs substantially from KirchofF and Zago (2001) in the 
respect that I assume that under a mandatory GM-labeling policy that firms producing 
products would need to pay a per unit charge, while Kirchoff and Zago assume the 
government would pay for all testing charges in a mandatory labeling regime. 
3. These experimental markets were chosen to emulate the mandatory and voluntary GM 
labeling regimes currently in place throughout the world. The mandatory regime reflects 
the labels consumers might find in Europe, where foods that are GM must be labeled as 
such. The voluntary labeling regime captures the labels consumers might see the United 
States, where food manufacturers can label their products as non-genetically-engineered 
if they choose. I do not examine several other potential but currently non-implemented 
labeling policies, including a mandatory labeling policy that require all non-GM foods to 
label themselves, or a policy that requires every food product in a market labeled as GM 
or non-GM. 
4. Soybean oil was initially used in the April experiments -1 then tried to find non-GM 
soybean oil in 32 oz. bottles and was unsuccessful. The bids for the vegetable oil follow 
the same trend as the other products, and will be discussed in the results section of the 
paper. The other products (and packaging) were absolutely identical, except for the 
presence or absence of genetic modification. 
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5. Note that these labels are all on the front of the package, where consumers would surely 
see them. Read Noussair et al (2002) for evidence how consumers are not always likely 
to read labels on the back of packages. 
6. Regression models were also run, testing whether any of the demographic characteristics 
made a difference on the discount for the perceived GM food. No demographic 
characteristics appeared to impact the discount for the perceived GM food 
7. To check the robustness of the results, I also ran Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to see if one 
could reject that consumers had different behavior for the different label types. The 
results for the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are similar to those of the t-test results, showing 
that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that consumers perceive the signals from the 
two labeling policies the same. 
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3.7. Figures and Tables 
Table 3.7.1. Information and labeling given to treatments I through 8 
Treatment Labeling regime type Verifiable information Round with 
1. Voluntary regime Yes 1 
2. Voluntary regime Yes 2 
3. Voluntary regime No 1 
4. Voluntary regime No 2 
5. Mandatory regime Yes 1 
6. Mandatory regime Yes 2 
7. Mandatory regime No 1 
8. Mandatory regime No 2 
7 A* Mandatory regime No 1 
8A* Mandatory regime No 2 
* Treatments 7 and 8 are replicated across time. Treatments 7 and 8 were conducted in 
April, while 7A and 8A were conducted in December. 
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Russet Potatoes 
Net weight 5 lb. 
Russet Potatoes 
Net weight 5 lb. 
This product is made without 
using genetic modification 
Russet Potatoes 
Net weight 5 lb. 
This product is made using 
genetic modification (GM) 
Figure 3.7.2. The Three Types of Labels 
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Table 3.7.3. Mean Bids 
A. Mean bids when participants bid on food in a mandatory GM-labeling market 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 86 0.63 0.65 0.50 0 2.75 
OIL 86 0.74 0.75 0.50 0 3.29 
GM CHIPS 86 0.61 0.70 0.43 0 3.25 
CHIPS 86 0.69 0.72 0.50 0 2.89 
GM POTATOES 86 0.59 0.54 0.50 0 2.00 
POTATOES 86 0.67 0.54 0.50 0 2.25 
B. Mean bids when participants bid on food in a voluntary GM-labeling market 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
NGMOIL 56 0.80 0.80 0.50 0 4.75 
OIL 56 0.76 0.68 0.50 0 3.00 
NGM CHIPS 56 0.75 0.81 0.50 0 4.00 
CHIPS 56 0.68 0.77 0.50 0 4.00 
NGM POTATOES 56 0.84 0.75 0.75 0 4.00 
POTATOES 56 0.75 0.70 0.68 0 4.00 
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Table 3.7.4. Test on whether difference for "perceived" GM and "perceived" non-GM 
foods are different 
N—142 
Difference T-Test Statistic 
OIL 0.08 2.04 •• 
CHIPS 0.07 2.64 ** 
POTATES 0.09 3.31 *• 
Table 3.7.5. T-Test to examine whether bids for *perceived" GM and non-GM foods are 
different under alternative labeling regimes 
n=142 
Perceived GM/non-GM food Mean bid - Mean bid - Difference T-Test 
mandatory voluntary Statistic 
regime regime 
n=86 n=56 
GMOIL 0.74 0.80 0.06 1.10 
NON-GM OIL 0.63 0.76 0.13 0.45 
GM CHIPS 0.69 0.75 0.06 0.56 
NON-GM CHIPS 0.61 0.68 0.07 0.53 
GM POTATES 0.59 0.75 0.16 1.53 
NON-GM POTATOES 0.67 0.84 0.17 1.57 
Table 3.7.6. T-Test to determine whether difference in bids are statistically different 
Difference - Difference — Difference T-Test Statistic 
mandatory regime voluntary regime 
Oil 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.90 
Chips 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 
Potatoes 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.20 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT AND VALUE OF VERIFIABLE INFORMATION IN 
A CONTROVERSIAL MARKET 
4.1. Introduction 
R&D frequently leads to the development of new inputs and consumer goods, and the 
introduction of new products, e.g., foods, can lead to information wars as interested parties 
try to influence market outcomes. Two groups dominate the debate over genetically 
modified (GM) foods. These groups have very different ideas or beliefs about the benefits 
and risks of agricultural biotechnology. Agribusiness companies like Monsanto and 
Syngenta support agricultural biotechnology and say that GM foods will help protect the 
environment, increase nutrition, and help end world hunger (Council for Biotechnology 
Information, 2001). Environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth oppose 
agricultural biotechnology and say that GM foods could cause allergic reactions, will hurt the 
environment, and could increase the power of multinational companies (Greenpeace, 2001). 
One could characterize the on-going GM-food controversy as an information war between 
the pro- and anti-biotech interest groups. The average U.S. consumer and farmer has 
available to him (her) diverse information from these interested parties as they make 
decisions on the use of GM products. Socially good or bad decisions may result 
With two interested parties injecting diverse information into in a controversial 
market, what are rational consumers likely to do? Ideally, these buyers will make informed 
decisions provided they are (a) sophisticated enough to understand the technical processes at 
work and to recognize that interested parties' supply information tainted by a political 
agenda, and (b) they can verify all the information provided (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). 
Unfortunately, this full and verifiable information environment does not define the market 
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for genetically modified products. Genetic modification is a complex process, which 
involves taking genes from one organism and placing them into another. Most consumers do 
not know the intricate details of this process. In addition, not all information on GM is 
currently verifiable. Also, the search costs for most consumers to find neutral information is 
very high, as there are contradictory messages about GM as "food to feed the planet" versus 
GM as "frankenfood" (see for example Gates, 2001). Because of these high search costs, a 
verifiable information source — defined as a source that has no financial ties to genetic 
modification and produces information that is verifiable - could have tremendous consumer 
value (Huffman and Tegene, 2002). 
Limited evidence from earlier surveys and the lab suggests that consumers only hear 
the bad news in a controversial market with diverse information and without verifiable 
information. Individuals amplify the risks of a neoteric product and discount its benefits. 
Viscusi (1997), for instance, showed using a survey that when consumers received divergent 
information on environmental risks, they put greater weight on the expert who provided a 
high-risk assessment. They did so regardless of whether the low-risk assessment came from 
a government or an industry source. A similar "alarmist" reaction to a new product was also 
observed in Fox, Hayes, and Shogren's (2001) lab auction experiment on the value of food 
irradiation. Their initial results follow intuition: a favorable description of irradiation 
increased demand and an unfavorable description decreased demand. But when presented 
with both a favorable and unfavorable description, demand fell to zero, suggesting the 
negative portrayal dominated the positive. Bidders bid as if they had only heard the anti-
irradiation argument, despite the fact that the negative information was presented by a 
consumer advocacy group and was presented in a non-scientific manner. 
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Consistent with several models of choice under risk (e g., loss aversion, status quo 
bias, Bayesian updating), this result illustrates the incentive for partisan groups to promote 
unscientific claims for their personal gain and for loss in welfare of others. The open 
question that neither the Viscusi (1998) nor Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2001) studies address 
is the potential social value of introducing third party verifiable information about the risks 
and benefits of the controversial products for sale in the market One attempt to estimate the 
value of such information was Foster and Just's (1989) study on how news of insecticide 
contamination (heptachlor) affected milk consumption in Hawaii. Foster and Just calculated 
the value of third party information as the difference in rational consumers' choices under 
incomplete and more complete information. They estimated the value of information as 
about $10.00 per person per month. Foster and Just did not, however, control for the type of 
information as a treatment variable. A distinguishing feature of this experiment is controlling 
for the type of information that is given to consumers. 
This chapter examines the effects of information on consumers' demand for new food 
products, GM-foods, in an environment where information from one or more interested 
parties is provided. Four issues are examined. First how does diverse information from 
interested parties affect consumers' willingness to pay for genetically modified foods? 
Second, does third party or verifiable information on genetic modification, in an environment 
where pro- or (and) anti-biotech information is provided, change consumers' purchasing 
behavior? Third, if behavior changes, what is the value of verifiable information to 
consumers? Fourth, if the results are generalized to the aggregate U.S. demand for processed 
foods, what is the approximate annual social value? 
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4.2. Theoretical Model 
4.2.1 Model in a Household Production Framework 
To foster better understanding of the reasons consumers choose whether or not to 
consume GM-labeled foods, I will first consider a household production model. Once 
intuition is gained into why consumers would choose whether or not to consume GM-labeled 
foods, a state dependent utility model is used to derive some predictions of consumer 
behavior. Consumers obtain utility in this static model from three different goods: food 
safety, environmental quality and energy. Consumers can not directly consume these three 
goods; instead they must be produced. Consumers produce these three goods by consuming 
two inputs: foods that are labeled as genetically modified and foods that are not labeled as 
genetically modified (plain-labeled foods). 
This setup is represented in equations 1-3, where ZJav represents environmental 
quality, represents health, and Z'a& represents energy. All three goods depend on the 
same two commodities: the consumption of foods that are labeled as genetically modified, 
affects the consumer's perceived production of food safety, environmental quality, and 
energy. When a consumer receives new positive information on genetic modification they 
will perceive greater production of at least one of the three goods. When a consumer 
receives negative information on GM foods they will perceive smaller production of at least 
^Lbeud and the consumption of plain-labeled foods, X'M Information / ~ (—00,00) 
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one of the three goods. The information a consumer receives is exogenous, and can differ 
among individuals. Notice that this model mentions a consumer's perceived production of 
goods. This is because the information that a consumer obtains will not always be correct, 
yet unless they know better, a change in information will change the consumer's perceived 
production. This approach, viewing consumers as using the information available to them to 
the best of their ability, but possibly not using all the relevant information is similar to the 
approach used in Foster and Just (1989). 
The consumer's objective is to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. 
The utility function is shown in equation 4. Consumers get utility from environmental 
quality, health, and energy. Consumer's utility is constrained by income, and the consumer 
objective is to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. One can determine a 
consumer's optimal quantity of each good by maximizing the Lagrangian, as shown in 
equation 5: 
In this maximization problem, Xj is the Lagrangian Multiplier, M ' is the consumer 
y's (money) income, and p, is the price for product /. Solving this problem gives the first 
order conditions shown in equations 6 through 8. Equation 8 is the budget constraint, and 




 ^ Plabeled l^abeled P non-labeled^ non-labeled 1 " 
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(7) 
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dXLm-tabded ^Lv n^ot-labeled ^Lh ^Lm-labeled 
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Some useful insights into the consumer decision process can be gained by looking at how 
consumers choose their utility maximizing bundle. First rearrange equation 6 by putting the 
price for GM foods times the marginal utility of income k on the right hand side. The right-
hand side now has price times the marginal utility of income (the standard result from 
(6\ du(«) dZL , M*) dZL M*) dZe*gy  ^ y 
consumer theory), but the left-hand side is less typical. The first term on the left hand side is 
the marginal utility from increased environmental quality, and it is multiplied by the marginal 
effect on environmental quality from eating additional GM-labeled foods. The second term 
on the left-hand side is the marginal utility from health, multiplied by the marginal effect of 
health from consuming GM-labeled foods. The third term is similar, containing the marginal 
utility from energy, multiplied by the marginal effect on energy from consuming GM-labeled 
foods. So consumers maximize utility by considering the marginal effects of the three 
different goods; environmental quality, health and energy. Inequality (7) is similar, in that 
the consumer must consider the impact of plain-labeled foods on food safety, environmental 
quality, and energy. 
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This is important because each consumer considers three different aspects of GM-
labeled foods when considering how to maximize utility. Some consumers may consume 
less GM-labeled foods because they perceive health risks, while other consumers may 
consume less (or more) GM-labeled foods because they are concerned about the 
environmental impact The first order conditions show that different consumers may avoid 
GM-labeled foods for different reasons. Now consider a more simplified theoretical 
specification. 
4.2.2. Model in a State-Dependent Utility Framework 
Following Viscusi and Evans (1990), I begin the empirical specification by first 
developing a state-dependent utility model of GM food consumption given diverse 
information. A person compares his perceived expected utility (henceforth, utility) from 
consuming GM-labeled foods and plain-labeled foods. These two goods are nearly perfect 
substitutes, in which consumption can result in either a good or bad outcome, with distinct 
probabilities.1 Equation (1) shows the state-dependent utility function for a consumer who 
purchases GM-labeled food, called labeled; equation (2) is his utility for a purchase of plain-
labeled foods, called non-labeled 
( i)  =mLw (#/ '  W+(i -  aLw MX" W 
where consumer fs income is w, and M is the monetary premium he pays for the non-labeled 
food (the premium can be positive, negative, or zero). Consumer j obtains utility UJ if the 
g o o d  s t a t e  o c c u r s ,  a n d  V s  i f  t h e  b a d  s t a t e  o c c u r s ,  w h e r e  U J  > V j  > 0 .  
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Assume the bad state occurs when either consumer j becomes ill or a bad 
environmental outcome occurs (e.g., genetic cross-breeding). Let pflMrAl) and 
P io«-iabeied (/) he consumerfs perceived probability that the GM-labeled food and plain-
labeled food will yield the good state. Assume the information the consumer has on genetic 
modification, I ~ (-00,00) affects the perceived probability that GM-labeled foods will result 
in a good state. Large positive / represents positive or favorable information on GM foods; 
large negative / represents negative or less favorable information on GM foods. When a 
consumer gets positive information on GM foods, / increases and the consumer perceives 
greater utility from GM-labeled foods and greater marginal utility from GM-labeled foods. 
The information a consumer receives in the experiments is randomly assigned, and can differ 
among participants. The consumer's perceived probability of a good outcome from plain-
labeled food does not depend on information about GMfoods. 
When equation (3) holds, the consumer is indifferent between purchasing GM-labeled 
and plain-labeled foods: 
(3) EUÙm(w) = EUL._um(,W-M). 
or: 
(3a) (1 - pLw(f)M")= 
The consumer prefers GM-labeled foods when the left-hand side of (3a) exceeds the right-
hand side; otherwise he prefers the plain-labeled foods. In addition, standard comparative 
statics show that an increase in positive GM information increases the consumer's likelihood 





t>pLJjPJ M+ V'(w)  
>0. 
dl 
I now define the aggregate demand for GM foods. Let X^Mn1 represent the quantity 
of GM-labeled foods demanded by consumer j. Assume is positive for consumers 
who prefer GM-labeled foods, and zero otherwise. I sum the quantity demanded over all 
consumers to obtain the aggregate demand for GM-labeled foods:2 
(4) AGDEMANDbMeJ =^TdXLMct(I). 
j 
Assume the population of consumers is heterogeneous in tastes and income such that they 
can be grouped as: (i) consumers of GM-labeled products, (ii) consumers who initially 
consume plain-labeled foods but switch to GM-labeled product with more positive GM 
information; and (iii) consumers of plain-label foods who never switch with positive 
information. Now split aggregate demand for GM-labeled foods into those consumers who 
initially buy GM-labeled foods and those who do not: 
(4a) AGDEUAND  ^= £ X££ (/)+£ XS%? (/). 
Taking the derivative of (4a) with respect to information / yields: 
M >0 
8AGDEMAND  ^ (I) „ SX  ^(I) . 
(5) ar  ^h M 
which says that an increase in positive information / increases the aggregate demand for GM-
labeled foods. The first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the derivative for those who 
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initially consumed the GM-labeled product, and it can be greater than or equal to zero. The 
second term is the derivative for consumers who do not initially consume GM-labeled foods. 
For some individuals this derivative is zero, and for others, this derivative is positive because 
they switch to GM-labeled foods. The second summation term is positive, and the aggregate 
demand for GM-labeled foods is increasing in information /. The opposite result holds for 
negative information. 
4.3. Econometric Model 
4.3.1. General Setup 
I now consider the specific regression analysis used to examine consumer behavior 
under diverse information. The regressions hold consumers' tastes constant for each of the 
three products by making the dependent variable the difference in bid prices for plain-labeled 
and GM-labeled products for each participant Taking the difference of the demand 
equations for each product in the two trials derives this price difference. Let the inverse 
demand equation for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled food be: 
pnon-tabded _  ^non-labeled n^on-labeled^ n^on-labeled 
and 
(7) + fi^KkdXn + /if**. 
where Pj represents the price bid for a good by participantj\ p\ is an intercept term; Xj2 is a 
vector of exogenous variables, and fh is the associated vector of coefficients. Hj is a zero 
mean disturbance term. 
Subtracting equation (7) from equation (6), I obtain an equation in which the 
dependent variable is the difference in bid prices for the two trials: 
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nnon-labeled plabeled 
f8) J 1 
nnon-labeied n labeled ( rtitom-labeJed relabeled \ y , ntm-labeled labeled 
P\ -Pi +\Pi -Pi fXji+Pj Pi 
The coefficients and error terms can be condensed and rewritten as: 
(8a) p™-**** - pf*" = p\ + p\xn + m] • 
The difference in bid prices is explained by an intercept term P', a slope term Pi that is 
multiplied by a vector of exogenous characteristics Xj2, and a random error term //*• .3 
Equation (8a) is likely to be censored because a zero bid for the GM-labeled product 
or the plain-labeled product or both may occur. This censoring has four cases (see Table 
4.8.2.). Case (1): consumer j bids a positive amount for both the GM-labeled and the plain-
labeled product; the measured difference in bid prices is the difference between the two bid 
prices. Case (2): consumer j bids zero for the GM-labeled product and a positive amount for 
the plain-labeled product. The "true difference" in bid prices with the censored regression 
will be greater than the difference between the two observed bid prices. This arises because 
the bids on the GM-labeled product are censored at zero. Case (3): consumer j bids a 
positive amount for the GM-labeled product and zero for the plain-labeled product. This is 
the same as Case (2); the true difference in bid prices for the censored regression is 
absolutely larger than the measured difference between the two bid prices. Case (4): 
consumer j bids zero for both products. This does not give any information about their true 
demand for GM products. 
A positive aspect of using the censored regression model is that zero bid prices are 
correctly accounted for, and effects of bias from the zero bids are minimized. The 
disadvantage is that I must assume a bid price distribution. Assume the zero bid prices 
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would have followed a normal distribution, had they not been censored. Statistical tests are 
conducted using the likelihood ratio test statistic (Greene, 2000) to test the explanatory power 
of the variables.4 The large sample distribution of-2 In A is chi-squared, with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. 
4.3.2. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
Regressions are run for each of the three food products individually. It is useful to 
examine whether the coefficients are the same across the three products. If the coefficients 
are different, it provides evidence that consumers view genetic modification differently in 
different products. A seemingly unrelated regression allows a test of whether the coefficients 
differ across products. 
Recall equation 8 A, which contains the equation that will be estimated by regression. 
8A) _ p"** = + p\X j% + n). 
Consider 8 A for all three products, which yields regression equations for potatoes, tortilla 
chips and vegetable oil. These three equations can be put into matrix form, which is shown 
in equation 9: 
pium-labeled,pot plabeled,pot 
'X 0 0 ' ppo,' V'"" 
9) plum-labeled,chip plabeled,chip = 0 X 0 pchip + j f M p  
pnoH-labeled.oil plabeled,oil 0 0 X p°a 
In equation 9, X is the (n x k) matrix that contains all the individual exogenous characteristic 
vectors Xj2, P is a (zi x l) vector that contains prices for all participants, is the vector of 
coefficients, and // is an (n x l) vector that contains every participants error term. One may 
want to test if certain variables have the same impact for different products. For example, 
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one may want to test if gender has the same impact on the dependent variable for potatoes as 
it does for tortilla chips and vegetable oil. Equation 8 can be rewritten, separating 
the AT matrix and the p vectors into two parts, one part that will be restricted and one part that 
will not be restricted. This is shown in equation 9A. 
9A) 
p non-labeled, pot plabeled ,pol 
plum-labeled .chip _ p labeled .chip 
pium-labeled,oil plabeled,oil 
\X„XU] 0 0 
0 [*„,*„] 0 










In equation 9 A, \XR ,ATy] is the matrix X partitioned into a restricted part and an 
unrestricted part. The vector of coefficients y* lis the vector P partitioned into a restricted 
L Pu\ 
part and an unrestricted part. One can test the unrestricted model in equation (9A) against a 
model that restricts certain coefficients to be the same across the equations. The restricted 
version of equation 9 A is shown in equation 10. The coefficients /?,* are restricted (to be the 
same) across all three equations. One can now test if both models are equivalent, which 
would indicate that the coefficients are the same across equations. 
10) 
' pmm-labeled,pot plabeled, pot 
pnon-labeled ,chip plabeled .chip 
p mon-labeled,oil plabeled.oil 
lx R ,x v ]  0 0 












A version of the F-test can be used to test the validity of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are the same across equations, versus an alternative hypothesis of negation as 
shown in equation 11: 
The F-test needed for this equation is shown in equation 12: 
12) {llfi - r) (fiCR'Jr1 (ltfi - r)-4 zfjy 
The chi-squared statistic is what the F-test in equation 11 converges to asymptotically if the 
null hypothesis is correct. The terms Rfi choose which variables will be restricted, where R 
is a matrix of O's and 1 's, and fi is the vector of estimated coefficients. The vector r is what 
the variables Rfi are being restricted to in the test The middle term in equation (10) is 
C = [at' (îr1 ® l]x j~', where (t™1 <8> /) is the Kronecker product of the estimated covariance 
matrix by the Identity matrix. This is a more generalized version of the covariance matrix 
than the one used with the standard F-test. 
4.4. The Value of Verifiable Information 
I now define the empirical specification to obtain the value of verifiable information. 
I compare the utility gained using the ex post probabilities of harm from GM labeled foods 
for those bidders who switched their purchasing behavior with new information. This 
approach is similar to the approach used by Foster and Just (1989) and Teisl et al. (2001). 
Because the goods are nearly perfect substitutes, consumers who receive third-party 
information on GM foods could change their relative preferences, but their preferences might 
not change enough to cause them to switch to the other good. As an example, assume a 
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consumer is initially willing to pay $1.00 for a GM-labeled food product and $2.00 for a 
plain-labeled food product, and the plain-labeled food costs $2.00. Suppose the market-
clearing price for the GM-labeled food is $1.60. The consumer would initially buy the plain-
labeled food. If third-party information increases the consumer's willingness to pay for the 
GM-labeled product from $1.00 to $1.50, the information changes the consumer's relative 
preference toward GM-labeled food but not enough to make him switch. Since the GM-
labeled food costs $ 1.60, he is still better off purchasing the plain-labeled version of the 
product. 
I evaluate two types of individuals who gain from third-party information. The first 
type is one who purchases GM-labeled foods before he received third party, verifiable 
information, but switches to plain-labeled foods after he receives the third-party information. 
The second type purchased plain-labeled foods before the third-party information is 
introduced, and then switches to GM-labeled foods after he receives the third-party 
information. 
What is the welfare gain for consumers who switch after verifiable information is 
released/provided? First, let's look at the welfare gains for a consumer who switches from 
the plain-labeled food to the GM-labeled food. The consumer originally purchases the plain-
labeled food, and the surplus the consumer receives from that purchase is the difference 
between his/her willingness to pay and the price for the plain-labeled food. Consumer f s 
surplus from purchasing plain-labeled food or GM-labeled food is shown in (9) and (10): 
(9) surplusL-Ubckd = WTPL-labded - PL~laMcd 
(10) labeled ~ tied ~ ^ labeled • 
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Because I am looking at the case in which a consumer originally purchases plain-
labeled foods, the consumer initially perceives a greater surplus from consuming the plain-
labeled food than from consuming the GM-labeled food. For consumers who switch after 
receiving third-party information, the surplus from purchasing the GM-labeled food is now 
greater than the surplus from purchasing the plain-labeled food. The welfare gain to the 
consumers who switch is the surplus they receive from purchasing the GM-labeled food 
minus the surplus they would receive if they purchased the plain-labeled food. Consumerj's 
increase in welfare from third-party information due to switching from the plain-labeled 
product to the GM-labeled product is: 
(11) PREMGAINiMat = surplus^ - surplus. 
Those consumers who initially purchased the GM-labeled food and then switched to 
the plain-labeled food after they received third-party information will also gain. Their gain 
will be the welfare gain from purchasing the plain-labeled foods minus the gain they would 
have received if they had purchased GM-labeled foods. The welfare gain of an individual j 
who switches from the GM-labeled product to the plain-labeled product is: 
(12) PREMGAINJnon_labeUd = surplus- surplus,^ . 
Note all consumers enjoy the premium gained by consuming one product instead of 
another, as shown in expressions (11) and (12), but the premium gained represents increased 
welfare (i.e., the value of information) for those who switch products. The total welfare 
gained for each product from a third-party source can be computed by summing the welfare 
gains over all individuals. The total value of information is obtained by summing the value 
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of infonnation for all individuals who switched to GM-labeled foods and all individuals who 
switched to plain-labeled foods: 
(13) SUMVAL = Y.PREMGAIN+ Y,PREMGAIN'^  ' 
jeswitdied jeswitdied 
There are three combinations of infonnation a person could have received when no 
third-party information is available. A consumer could have access to only positive 
information on GM foods, have access to only negative information on GM foods, or could 
have access to both positive and negative information on GM foods. The gains from third-
party information are computed for each of the three situations. 
Three magnitudes are needed to value verifiable information: (1) the difference in the 
marginal percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods after third-party information is 
introduced; (2) the value of third-party information to each person who switches; and (3) the 
average value of third-party information per person. These three values will be obtained for 
individuals in each of the three information settings (receiving positive information, 
receiving negative information, or receiving both positive and negative information). 
First, I determine the net change in the percentage of consumers who purchase GM-
labeled foods. The experimental auction provides data on how much a consumer values the 
plain-labeled product and the GM-labeled product, but no information on these prices. To 
compute the value of information, I need an estimate of the prices a consumer would face in 
the market. To do this, I assume that the price for a GM-labeled food is the mean bid price 
for that food product across all auction participants, and the price for the plain-labeled food 
is the mean bid price for that food product. Because I am trying to assess the average value 
of information for each product, I will assume that all participants purchase either the GM-
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labeled version or the plain-labeled version of a product Individuals purchase the product 
that gives him/her the greater surplus, as shown in equations (9) and (10). The net change in 
the percentage who purchase the GM-labeled product is the (absolute) difference between the 
"percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods when treated to third-party information" and 
the "percentage who purchase GM-labeled foods but do not receive third-party information;" 
given the other information they have received: 
(14) Percentswitch = | percentbuyGMUurdparty — percentbuyGMno~*m,party\. 
For participants who receive only negative information, third-party information should cause 
some to switch to GM-labeled foods. For participants who only receive positive information, 
one would expect some to switch to plain-labeled foods. For consumers who receive both 
positive and negative information, it is difficult to predict whether consumers would buy 
more or less GM-labeled food when third-party information is given. The net percentage 
change is the absolute value of the difference in the percentage who consume the GM-labeled 
food with and without third-party information. 
Who switches once third-party information is introduced? One cannot determine the 
particular individuals who switch, but I do know the percentage of the sample that switched 
after the introduction of third-party information. I assume that the individuals who switched 
had relative preferences for plain-labeled foods that were evenly distributed throughout the 
population who consumed the good that has been switched to. For example, if third-party 
information causes a number of consumers to switch their purchasing habits to consume GM-
labeled foods, I will assume that these consumers who switched had relative valuations of 
plain-labeled foods that were evenly distributed throughout the population of consumers who 
purchase the GM-labeled foods. 
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Second, I estimate the value of third-party infonnation to a person who switches 
either to or from the GM-labeled food. To determine the value of third-party information to 
a consumer who switches, divide the total value of verifiable information, as computed in 
equation (13), by the number of consumers who switched products: 
Z 1 C X  .  .  .  SUMVAL (15) switchervalue( = 
In equation (15), switchervalue, is the average value of third-party information to a 
consumer that switches his/her purchase of product / either to or from the GM-labeled food 
after they receive the third-party information. This works because I am assuming the 
consumers who switched are evenly distributed throughout the population of consumers. The 
total value of third-party information for product / can be obtained by multiplying the 
average value of third-party information per switcher by the number of switchers: 
(16) totalvalue, = switchervalue, x ft . 
Then the average value of third-party information for product I can be computed by dividing 
the total value of third-party information by the total number of consumers in the population: 
Z1 _x , totalvalue, (17) avevalueperson, =— 
Recall that to compute the value of information, prices had to be estimated. The 
prices for plain-labeled and GM-labeled foods were estimated as the mean bid prices for each 
of the three products, meaning that the discount for the GM-labeled foods was just the mean 
difference in bids. The sensitivity of the value of information to the relative price of GM-
labeled foods is now explored. To explore the sensitivity of the value of information, I will 
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consider a smaller and a larger price for the GM-labeled food. These are shown in equations 
18 and 19: 
(18) PGMUgher = MEAN™ +Q.5*(MEANmm-'abtkJ -MEANfa6eW) 
(19) PGMhwrT = MEAN™ -0.5*(MEANmm'hMai -MEANbMed). 
By changing the discount for the GM-labeled foods, I am examining how sensitive the value 
of information is the prices, which had to be estimated. 
In sum, the experimental auction data and econometric design allows a calculation of 
the percentage of consumers who switch in each of the information settings: receiving 
positive information, receiving negative information, or receiving both positive and negative 
information. The average value of third-party information per person who switches is then 
computed for each product. I then estimate an average value of third-party information per 
consumer in the population for each product, and then translate this into a total value to the 
United States. 
4.5. Results and Discussion 
The experimental design in this chapter exactly follows the experimental design 
described in chapter 2. A summary sheet of the 12 treatments given in this experiment are 
shown in table 4.8.1. Some participants chose to bid zero in both trials, i. e., for both the 
GM-labeled and the plain-labeled variety of a particular food product. These participants 
provide no information about their taste for genetic modification; they were willing to pay 
zero for one unit, indicating they had no demand for the particular food product. Tables 
4.8.3. and 4.8.4. present the mean bids for participants, segregated by information treatment. 
Table 4.8.3. includes all bids, while table 4.8.4 does not include bids for consumers who bid 
zero for both the GM-labeled and plain-labeled varieties of a product.5 In Table 4.8.4., the 
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number of participants who bid a positive amount for a product is different for each of the 
three goods. This arises because more consumers chose to bid zero for the GM-labeled and 
plain-labeled vegetable oils than for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled bags of tortilla chips, 
and the fewest number of consumers chose to bid zero for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled 
bags of potatoes. Many consumers who bid zero for both varieties of one product, bid a 
positive amount for the other products.6 
4.5.1 The Effect of Diverse Information 
I will discuss the results presented in table 4.8.4. Part A of table 4.8.4. shows the 
mean bid prices for all participants. Consumers, on average, discounted GM-labeled foods 
by fourteen percent. Part B shows that participants who received only positive information 
actually put a premium on the GM-labeled food for two of the three products. This was 
despite the fact that the genetic modification was only used to enhance the production 
process, and did not give the foods any enhanced attributes. Part C shows that when 
consumers received only negative information, they discount the GM-labeled foods by an 
average of approximately thirty-five percent. Part D shows that consumers who received 
both positive and negative information discount the GM-labeled foods by an average of 
seventeen to twenty-nine percent, depending on the food product. 
Third-party information has an impact on the willingness to pay for GM-labeled 
foods. Part E shows that consumers who received positive and third party information 
discounted GM-labeled foods slightly. This is in contrast to the consumers who received 
only positive information who valued the GM-labeled foods more than their plain-labeled 
counterpart on average. Part F shows that participants who received negative and third party 
information still discounted the GM-labeled foods, but by a smaller amount than the 
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participants who received only negative information. Part G shows that participants who 
received negative and third-party information discounted the GM-labeled foods by an 
average of seventeen to twenty-two percent, depending on the product. Participants who 
received positive, negative and third party information were more accepting of the GM-
labeled foods than those who received only positive and negative information. The 
participants who received positive, negative and third party information discounted the GM-
labeled food by an average of zero to eleven percent, depending on the product.7 
The results are consistent with Viscusi (1997) who found that individuals placed a 
slightly greater weight on negative information than positive information. In the auction, 
participants who-received only positive information did not discount the GM-labeled food, 
while those who received only negative information discounted the GM-labeled food by an 
average of 35 percent. Those who received both positive and negative information put 
slightly more weight on the negative information, discounting the GM-labeled foods by 20 
percent. The results here are in contrast to the results in Fox et al. (2002) who found that 
negative information dominated positive information. They argued that one reason could be 
due to a "status quo bias," (or endowment effect) where participants were originally endowed 
with a regular pork sandwich and could bid to upgrade to an irradiated pork sandwich. 
Participants may have their bids biased due to being endowed with one type of sandwich. 
This auction had participants bid on items in separate rounds (trials); thus these results are 
not influenced by a "status quo bias." 
Note that this chapter (and this dissertation) examines the impact of information on 
consumer behavior. Many have shown that consumers update their beliefs when they receive 
new information through Bayes rule (for example, see Viscusi 1997). Others would argue 
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that consumers do not use Bayes Rule to update their beliefs. How individuals process 
information, and then use information in their daily lives is an important topic but one that is 
not covered in this dissertation. 
Tables 4.8.5-4.8.7. display the censored regression results. For all three goods, 
models were fitted using five dummy variables to test for impacts of different information 
types. Dummy variables are defined for negative information; negative and positive 
information; positive and third party information; negative and third party information; and 
positive, negative, and third-party information. Positive information is the omitted 
information type from the reported regression results. Other regressors include gender, 
income, a dummy variable indicating if a person saw the food with GM labels in trial one, 
and a dummy variable indicating if the participant perceived themselves to be informed about 
GM foods.8 These variables allow us to control for selective demographic characteristics and 
examine how prior knowledge about genetically modified foods affects willingness to pay or 
demand. I will only be discussing the results from the censored regressions, but the results 
from OLS regressions both with and without the double-zero bids are presented in tables 
4.8.8-4.8.13.9 
The intercept term is statistically insignificant for all three products. The coefficients 
for the dummy variables indicating that participants received only negative information are 
large, positive, and statistically significant. The coefficients for the dummy variable 
indicating that an individual who received positive and negative information is positive and 
these coefficients are statistically significant for some of the food products. These results 
show individuals who received only negative or both positive and negative information 
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behaved differently than individuals who received only positive information when making 
purchasing decisions. 
The coefficients for the dummy variables where an individual received positive and 
third party information are small, positive, and not statistically significant. Hence, third-
party information does not have a large impact on the difference in bids between the plain-
labeled and GM-labeled foods for participants who received only positive information. 
The coefficients for the dummy variables indicating that a participant received 
negative and third party information are generally statistically significant. The coefficients 
for the dummy variables indicating that a participant received all three types of information 
are not statistically different from zero for any of the food products. The impact is not 
significantly different from the outcome when consumers received only positive information. 
Few demographic variables were found to contribute significantly in explaining bid 
price difference for the two trials. Females discounted GM-labeled foods by less than men 
for all of three products in the auctions. The fact that female consumers discounted GM-
labeled foods by less than men seems contrary to much of the risk perception literature that 
states that women are more risk averse. One explanation is that females on average have 
more experience shopping for food than do males. However, none of the coefficients was 
statistically significant from zero. 
Those consumers who had higher incomes discounted all three GM-labeled food 
products more than those who have lower incomes. The coefficient is statistically significant 
for one of the three products - vegetable oil. It is not surprising that higher income 
consumers discounted GM-labeled foods more heavily. This is consistent with "food 
quality" being a luxury good. 
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Those consumers who considered themselves at least "somewhat informed about GM 
foods" (as recorded in the pre-auction survey) discounted GM-labeled foods by more than 
other participants did. This coefficient is statistically significant (10% level) for one of the 
three food products - Russet potatoes. Those who perceived themselves to be informed bid 
far less for the GM-labeled foods than others. This result suggests they had heard negative 
information on GM foods prior to the experiment. In all of the censored regression 
equations, I rejected the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables included in the 
regression had no explanatory power (or all non-intercept coefficients were jointly zero). 
Table 4.8.14 shows the results of five different tests that examined restrictions across 
equations. An F-test is conducted to see if the coefficients for the three intercept terms were 
the same. Also, three separate tests are conducted to see if the three income coefficients were 
the same, the three coefficients on the dummy variable for gender were the same, and the 
three coefficients for the dummy variable indicating how informed an individual is on GM 
foods before the experiments. A test is also conducted that includes all of the restrictions at 
once. None of the restrictions can be rejected at a ten-percent level of significance. This 
implies that the coefficients for each of the three products are similar and consumers view 
genetic modification similarly across products. 
4.5.2. The Value of Verifiable Information 
I present the value of third-party information for each of the three cases a consumer 
could find themselves in: only receiving positive information, only receiving negative 
information, and receiving both positive and negative information. Table 4.8.15 presents the 
value of information results for the three food products: the marginal percentage of people 
who switch, the value to a person who switches, and the average value to a person in society. 
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When an individual received only positive information, one would expect third-party 
information to cause some individuals to switch to plain-labeled foods. These results show 
that this is not necessarily the case. Those consumers who received both positive and third 
party information were more likely to purchase GM-labeled potatoes, but they were less 
likely to purchase the GM-labeled tortilla chips than individuals who received only positive 
information. The share of consumers who switched to either of these goods is very small. 
The average value per person from the introduction of third-party information was 
approximately one-half cent per product 
While third-party information brought about virtually no change in consumption 
behavior for tortilla chips and potatoes, consumers who received positive and third-party 
information were much more likely to purchase GM-labeled vegetable oil than consumers 
who receive only positive information. Approximately fifteen percent of the population that 
received positive information switched from plain-labeled vegetable oil to GM-labeled 
vegetable oil after the introduction of third-party information. This is consistent with third-
party information revealing that when vegetable oils are refined, there is virtually no 
genetically modified material left in vegetable oil even when they are made from genetically 
engineered soybeans. For consumers who are worried about their own health, they now 
become more likely to purchase GM-labeled vegetable oil, even if they do not change their 
attitude towards other GM-labeled products. The value per person who switches to the GM-
labeled vegetable oil is almost twenty-one cents per switcher, and the average value per 
person is just over three cents per bottle. This is interesting because consumers who receive 
third-party information would get virtually no gain from this information except when 
purchasing the vegetable oil. While these are interesting results, very few participants have 
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heard only positive information about GM foods prior to the experiment Therefore, the 
other two groups - those who received only negative information and those who received 
both positive and negative information were probably more representative of the general 
population. 
One expects that consumers who initially received only negative information on GM 
foods but later were given third-party information to be more likely to consume GM-labeled 
foods. The results from the experiments validate this expectation. For all three products, a 
significant portion of the population switched from plain-labeled to the GM-labeled food: 
18.6 percent to 28.2 percent of people switch to the GM-labeled food, depending on the 
product. The value of the third-party information for each person who switches ranges from 
seventeen to twenty-five cents per item, depending on the product. 
Combining information together, the average consumer gains 4.7 cents per bag of 
tortilla chips, 6.7 cents per bottle of vegetable oil, and 4.3 cents per bag of potatoes when 
they initially received only negative information and then third-party information is 
introduced. Participants who received positive, negative and third party information are 
more likely to purchase GM-labeled foods than individuals who received only positive and 
negative information. The share of participants who switched from plain-labeled foods to 
GM-labeled foods is smaller for each of the three goods in this auction when compared to the 
participants who received negative information, but greater for each food than for individuals 
who receive only positive information. 
Only 8.7 percent of participants switched to the GM-labeled tortilla chips, while 15.9 
percent and 21.5 percent switched to the GM-labeled vegetable oil and GM-labeled potatoes. 
The value per person who switched from the plain-labeled to GM-labeled food ranged from 
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twenty-three to twenty-nine cents per product. This leads to an average value per person of 2 
cents per bag of tortilla chips, 4.3 cents per bottle of vegetable oil, and 6.3 cents for each bag 
of potatoes. 
The value of verifiable information was not too sensitive to the estimated prices, as 
shown in tables 4.8.16. - 4.8.18. Overall, the value of verifiable information is 
approximately 5 cents per product when using the larger discount for GM-labeled foods. 
When using the smaller discount for GM-labeled foods, the value of verifiable information 
was approximately 3 cents per product. 
Generalizing the per person value of information in an experiment to the aggregate 
value of the U.S. population is risky but instructive, even if only to understand the upper 
limit on the value that verifiable information on GM might provide. On average, the value of 
verifiable information is about 4 cents per product for those individuals who have heard 
either negative information or both positive and negative information on GM foods. Because 
the prices for these three food products typically range between $1.50 - $2.50, verifiable 
information has a value of approximately 2 percent of the purchase price for products that 
could be genetically modified. 
Estimates vary for the amount of foods on grocers' shelves that are GM. On the 
lower end, some observers predict that two thirds of all processed foods in the U.S. contain 
some GM material (Davis, 2001); on the upper end, some people argue that two thirds of all 
products in a grocery store contain GM material (Friends of the Earth, 2001). I approximate 
the aggregate value of verifiable information using a lower estimate, assuming one third of 
all products on a grocer's shelf might be GM. In 1997, U.S. citizens spent $390 billion for 
food at home (Putnam and Allshouse, 1999). Thus, if one third of all products are GM, 
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Americans spent roughly $130 billion on foods that could be GM. If verifiable information 
has a value of approximately 2 percent of the product's price, and if one could generalize 
these results the best estimate is that verifiable information would be worth about 2.6 billion 
dollars annually to U.S. consumers. 
While large, the aggregate value does not seem unrealistic.10 The value of $2.6 
billion divided by the number of people in the US gives an average value of approximately 
$9.00 per year for every man, woman, and child. Foster and Just found a value of 
information of approximately $10.00 per person, per month ($120.00 per year), using the 
same techniques. Their study only focused on milk, while this study is examining all 
consumer foods that might be genetically modified. 
4.6. Conclusion 
While new food products developed using genetic modification remain controversial, 
the results showed that pro-, and-, and verifiable biotech information have significant 
impacts on consumers' demand for GM-labeled foods. This experimental design revealed 
three key results. First, information about GM foods from interested parties impacts 
consumer demand. This helps explain why groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth have been disseminating massive amounts of negative information on GM foods. 
Although these groups are interested parties and provide biased information, their 
information has an impact Likewise, it explains why biotechnology companies have 
invested heavily to advertise the positive aspects of biotechnology (Thrane, 2001). Although 
these companies are interested parties and provide biased information, their information has 
increased the demand for GM-foods— even in the presence of negative information. This is 
important because previous literature dealing with other new food products, e.g., irradiated 
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pork, showed that negative information tends to dominate positive information when both are 
presented to consumers. 
Second, an independent, third party source that provides verifiable information on 
GM foods has a significant impact on consumers' demand for GM foods. Third-party 
information had its greatest impact on consumers who received negative information, 
prompting them to view GM foods more favorably and to increase their demand. 
Finally, through a new method developed to determine the value of information, it 
was shown that third-party information on GM foods could have a value of $2.6 billion per 
year to U S consumers. Although this number may seem large to some readers, I believe that 
it is a lower bound estimate because the anti-biotechnology lobby has in some cases been 
successful in getting such large reductions in the demand for GM products that they have 
been removed from the shelves of grocery stores. This type of holdup outcome would have 
much greater welfare costs than the marginal effects of information that I have estimated. A 
second reason why $2.6 billion is an underestimate of social value of verifiable information 
is that this information has international public good attributes (Huffinan and Tegene 2002). 
Therefore, the total social value of verifiable information is potentially much larger than this 
estimate. Because of the large social value of verifiable information on GM food and the 
unlikelyhood that another country will provide it, i.e., free-rider problem among affected 
countries (Huffman and Tegene 2002), the United States should develop a new third-party 
institution, separate from the federal government, to oversee the provision of this 
information. Resources to support this activity, however, seem most likely to come from 
federal tax collections because of the free-rider problem within the United States. 
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4.7. Notes 
1. Each individual consumer chooses between GM-labeled and plain-labeled foods, which 
are technically described as having a linear indifference curve. Assuming away the 
possibility that the budget constraint line lies exactly on the consumer's linear 
indifference curve, if the consumer purchases multiple quantities of the same product, all 
of the purchases will be the GM-food or all of the product will be the non-GM food. 
2. Assume no non-pecuniary external effect across consumers occurs. 
3. Because no bid prices are revealed until all bids are placed and participants in a trial were 
restricted from talking with each other, there is no contemporaneous correlation of 
random disturbance terms across participants in a trial. 
4. The likelihood ratio takes the maximum of the likelihood function of a regression that 
only has an intercept term (the restricted equation) divided by the maximum of the 
likelihood function of the regression that includes some explanatory variables (the 
unrestricted equation). This is shown in the following equation: 
In this equation, LR represents the maximum of the likelihood function for the regression 
with only the intercept term, and Lu represents the maximum of the likelihood function 
for the unrestricted equation. 
5. The percentage discount of foods is similar to the percentage when all bids are included. 
6. Only 7 out of the 172 participants bid zero for all six products. 
7. The possibility of variability due to factors that are not controlled, e.g., time of day, 
particular date the auction was held, was considered. By testing the difference between 
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sequences, I found that the interaction term for infonnation and labeling treatments was 
zero for all three products. This supports the analysis of treating each individual as a 
separate observation. 
8. Several other models were fitted which included as regressors, the participant's age, 
marital status, religious upbringing, and educational attainment. None of these variables, 
however, impacted the difference in bid prices in a statistically significant way (at the 
ten-percent level). 
9. The results for the OLS regressions are similar, which is reassuring since the number of 
double zero bids per product was never more than 20%. 
10. One could argue that this might underestimate value for two reasons. First, this model 
presumes people who did not change their consumption habits of genetic modification get 
no value from new information. This is a restrictive assumption, as some people may 
feel better about their consumption if verifiable information confirms that they were 
making the correct choices, relative to their preferences. Second, I am considering the 
aggregate value to U.S. consumers only. But this information would also be freely 
available to people in foreign countries who make up 19/20* of the world population, 
which implies more aggregate value for the GM information. 
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4.8. Tables 
Table 4.8.1. Information and labeling given to treatments one through twelve 
treatment Positive/negative Verifiable Information Round with GM labels 
1. Pro-biotech Yes 1 
2. Anti-biotech Yes 1 
3. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 1 
4. Pro-biotech Yes 2 
5. Anti-biotech Yes 2 
6 Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 2 
7 Pro-biotech No 1 
8 Anti-biotech No 1 
9. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 1 
10. Pro-biotech No 2 
11. Anti-biotech No 2 
12. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech No 2 
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Table 4.8.2. The four cases of the censored regression 
Case Plain-labeled bid GM-labeled bid Censored Regression Difference 
1. plum-labeled plabeled pmm-labded plabeled 
2. plum-labeled Q  ^pmtm-labeled 
3. 0 plabeled < _ plabeled Qr > |_ plabeled | 
4. 0 0 
. represents a missing value, due to the zero bids. 
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Table 4.8.3. Mean bids for all participants 
A. Mean bids - all participants 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 172 0.91 0.84 0.75 0 3.99 
OIL 172 1.05 0.85 1.00 0 3.79 
GM CHIPS 172 0.93 0.86 0.70 0 3.99 
CHIPS 172 1.08 0.85 0.99 0 4.99 
GM POTATOES 172 0.78 0.67 0.69 0 3.00 
POTATOES 172 0.91 0.67 0.80 0 3.89 
B. Mean bids when participants only received positive information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 30 1.35 0.87 1.50 0 2.99 
OIL 30 1.33 0.90 1.50 0 3.50 
GM CHIPS 30 1.31 0.72 1.13 0 2.99 
CHIPS 30 1.36 0.72 1.18 0 2.99 
GM POTATOES 30 1.17 0.78 1.03 0 2.50 
POTATOES 30 1.13 0.75 1.10 0 2.00 
C. Mean bids when participants only received negative information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 29 0.71 0.81 0.46 0 3.25 
OIL 29 1.09 0.73 1.00 0 2.49 
GM CHIPS 29 0.81 0.94 0.50 0 3.99 
CHIPS 29 1.25 1.02 1.00 0 4.99 
GM POTATOES 29 0.61 0.68 0.50 0.05 2.75 
POTATOES 29 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.05 3.89 
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D. Mean bids when participants received both positive and negative information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 28 0.59 0.56 0.50 0 1.79 
OIL 28 0.77 0.74 0.50 0 3.00 
GM CHIPS 28 0.55 0.72 0.25 0 2.25 
CHIPS 28 0.67 0.78 0.30 0 2.75 
GM POTATOES 28 0.46 0.40 0.50 0 1.50 
POTATOES 28 0.64 0.45 0.50 0 1.60 
E. Mean bids when participants received both positive and third-party information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 28 1.04 0.67 1.00 0 2.39 
OIL 28 1.06 0.62 1.00 0 2.39 
GM CHIPS 28 1.11 0.82 1.03 0 2.79 
CHIPS 28 1.19 0.81 1.00 0 2.89 
GM POTATOES 28 0.86 0.49 0.99 0 1.85 
POTATOES 28 0.87 0.45 0.99 0 1.90 
F. Mean bids when participants received both negative and third-party information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 29 0.97 1.08 0.50 0 3.99 
OIL 29 1.16 1.09 0.99 0 3.79 
GM CHIPS 29 0.96 0.97 0.69 0 3.50 
CHIPS 29 1.19 0.86 0.99 0 3.00 
GM POTATOES 29 0.83 0.78 0.75 0 3.00 
POTATOES 29 1.06 0.71 0.89 0 3.00 
G. Mean bids when participants received positive, negative and third party information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 28 0.77 0.79 0.68 0 2.75 
OIL 28 0.87 0.85 0.89 0 3.29 
GM CHIPS 28 0.78 0.82 0.55 0 3.25 
CHIPS 28 0.78 0.70 0.60 0 2.89 
GM POTATOES 28 0.70 0.64 0.79 0 1.99 
POTATOES 28 0.72 0.59 0.77 0 2.00 
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Table 4.8.4. Mean bids for people, excludes double-zero bids 
A. Mean bids - all participants 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 146 1.07 0.81 0.99 0 3.99 
OIL 146 1.24 0.78 1.00 0 3.79 
GM CHIPS 155 1.03 0.85 0.99 0 3.99 
CHIPS 155 1.20 0.81 1.00 0.05 4.99 
GM POTATOES 159 0.84 0.66 0.75 0 3 
POTATOES 159 0.98 0.65 0.89 0 3.89 
B. Mean bids when participants only received positive information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 26 1.56 0.73 1.50 0 2.99 
OIL 26 1.54 0.79 1.55 0 3.50 
GM CHIPS 30 1.31 0.72 1.13 0 2.99 
CHIPS 30 1.36 0.72 1.18 0.05 2.99 
GM POTATOES 27 1.30 0.71 1.25 0 2.50 
POTATOES 27 1.26 0.67 1.25 0 2.00 
C. Mean bids when participants only received negative information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 26 0.79 0.82 0.50 0 3.25 
OIL 26 1.22 0.65 1.00 0.25 2.49 
GM CHIPS 29 0.81 0.94 0.50 0 3.99 
CHIPS 29 1.25 1.02 1.00 0.05 4.99 
GM POTATOES 29 0.61 0.68 0.50 0 2.75 
POTATOES 29 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.05 3.89 
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D. Mean bids when participants received both positive and negative information. 
n mean bid stddev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 24 0.68 0.55 0.50 0 1.79 
OIL 24 0.90 0.72 0.85 0 3.00 
GM CHIPS 23 0.68 0.74 0.35 0 2.25 
CHIPS 23 0.81 0.79 0.49 0.05 2.75 
GM POTATOES 26 0.50 0.39 0.50 0 1.50 
POTATOES 26 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.05 1.60 
E. Mean bids when participants received both positive and third-party information. 
n mean bid stddev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 26 1.12 0.62 1.00 0 2.39 
OIL 26 1.14 0.57 1.00 0.10 2.39 
GM CHIPS 25 1.24 0.77 1.19 0 2.79 
CHIPS 25 1.33 0.73 1.16 0.20 2.89 
GM POTATOES 26 0.92 0.45 0.99 0 1.85 
POTATOES 26 0.93 0.39 0.99 0.25 1.90 
F. Mean bids when participants received both negative and third-party information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 21 1.33 1.05 1.25 0 3.99 
OIL 21 1.60 0.97 1.50 0.49 3.79 
GM CHIPS 25 1.12 0.97 0.99 0 3.50 
CHIPS 25 1.38 0.77 1.01 0.49 3.00 
GM POTATOES 27 0.89 0.77 0.89 0 3.00 
POTATOES 27 1.14 0.67 0.99 0.50 3.00 
G. Mean bids when participants received positive, negative and third party information. 
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum 
GMOIL 23 0.94 0.77 0.95 0 2.75 
OIL 23 1.06 0.82 1.00 0.05 3.29 
GM CHIPS 23 0.95 0.81 0.85 0 3.25 
CHIPS 23 0.95 0.66 0.99 0.1 2.89 
GM POTATOES 24 0.82 0.61 1.00 0 1.99 
POTATOES 24 0.84 0.55 0.84 0.01 2.00 
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Table 4.8.5. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between 
GM-labeled and plain-labeled tortilla chips 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food — bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pro 0.060 0.093 0.106 0.008 0.039 -0.034 
(0.099) (0.110) (0.119) (0.137) (0.119) (0.151) 
Anti 0.481 0.473 0.474 ** 0.481 ** 0.489 0.494 *» 
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144) 
Pro and Anti 0.132 0.124 0.128 0.138 0.136 0.147 
(0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) 
Pro and third-party 0.035 0.031 0.035 0.003 0.023 0.001 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.148) 
Anti and third-party 0.245 * 0.241 0.246 ** 0.244* 0.241 0.256 * 
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) 
All information -0.027 -0.023 -0.019 0.003 -0.028 -0.009 
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.063 -0.063 -0.064 -0.045 -0.050 













Likelihood ratio test 15.92 ** 16.28 ** 16.49 *» 17.93 ** 17.70 ** 18.83 ** 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.6. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between 
GM-labeled and plain-labeled vegetable oiL 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.032 0.053 0.117 -0.128 -0.015 -0.104 
(0.126) (0.142) (0.150) (0.169) (0.152) (0.180) 
Anti 0.530 0.496 0.504 ** 0.505 ** 0.516 •* 0.529 ** 
(0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) (0.181) (0.178) 
Pro and Anti 0.259 0.231 0.262 0.255 0.250 0.295 
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) 
Pro and third-party 0.061 0.046 0.079 -0.012 0.032 0.014 
(0.179) (0.178) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177) (0.179) 
Anti and third-party 0.335 * 0.301 0.338 * 0.288 0.312* 0.333 * 
(0.190) (0.191) (0.192) (0.188) (0.190) (0.189) 
All information 0.186 0.181 0.204 0.208 0.170 0.218 
(0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.182) (0.184) (0.182) 
Labels-Round 1 
-0.139 -0.136 -0.149 -0.115 -0.127 













Likelihood ratio test 10.90 * 12.52 * 14.11 ** 16.21 ** 14.09 ** 18.63 ** 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.7. Censored Regression Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between 
GM-labeled and plain-labeled potatoes. 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food — bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.039 0.064 0.076 -0.019 -0.029 -0.069 
(0.088) (0.096) (0.103) (0.117) (0.101) (0.124) 
Anti 0.504 ** 0.470 ** 0.472 0.478 ** 0.501 ** 0.507 ** 
(0.125) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.120) 
Pro and Anti 0.262 ** 0.233 * 0.239 * 0.248 0.258 0.271 ** 
(0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) 
Pro and third-party 0.057 0.041 0.046 0.018 0.026 0.015 
(0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.120) (0.122) 
Anti and third-party 0.339 ** 0.323 ** 0.329 ** 0.322 ** 0.332 ** 0.337 ** 
(0.125) (0.123) (0.124) (0.122) (0.120) (0.122) 
All information 0.088 0.095 0.099 0.110 0.078 0.092 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.174** -0.174** -0.177 ** -0.146 ** -0.150** 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Gender -0.026 -0.022 
(0.075) (0.074) 
Income 0.0014 0.0009 
(0.0014) (0.0011) 
Informed 0.190 ** 0.179 ** 
(0.074) (0.075) 
Likelihood ratio test 22.54 ** 28.17 28.29 ** 29.69 ** 34.56 ** 35.36 ** 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.8. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non-GM labeled tortilla chips 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.052 0.101 0.116 0.021 0.049 0.002 
(0.087) (0.095) (0.102) (0.116) (0.103) (0.127) 
Anti 0.382 ** 0.374 ** 0.376 0.381 * 0.395 0.400 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) 
Pro and Anti 0.056 0.047 0.054 0.062 0.063 0.080 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.127) 
Pro and third-party 0.027 0.027 0.032 0.006 0.020 0.009 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) 
Anti and third-party 0.176 0.178 0.185 0.180 0.183 0.190 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) 
All information -0.048 -0.045 -0.042 -0.030 -0.048 -0.034 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.091 -0.090 -0.093 -0.075 -0.078 













R2 .087 .096 .097 .104 .105 111 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.9. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non-GM labeled vegetable oil 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.022 0.062 0.114 -0.101 0.007 -0.080 
(0.102) (0.111) (0.118) (0.134) (0.120) (0.147) 
Anti 0.441 ** 0.397 0.403 •» 0.411 ** 0.419 ** 0.432 »* 
(0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.145) (0.144) 
Pro and Anti 0.207 0.190 0.214 0.222 0.208 0.252 * 
(0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.145) (0.146) (0.146) 
Pro and Third-party 0.041 0.041 0.061 -0.000 0.034 0.016 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) 
Anti and Third-party 0.214 0.217 0.241 * 0.222 0.222 0.247 * 
(0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) 
All information 0.118 0.124 0.132 0.155 0.121 0.155 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.158 ** -0.154 * -0.162 * -0.141 -0.146 * 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) 
Gender -0.108 -0.095 
(0.088) (0.088) 
Income 0.0028 ** 0.0025 * 
(0.0013) (0.0014) 
Informed 0.106 0.082 
(0.089) (0.090) 
R2 .058 .077 .086 .101 .085 .112 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.10. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non-GM labeled potatoes 
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.037 0.054 0.063 -0.024 -0.025 -0.072 
(0.073) (0.079) (0.085) (0.096) (0.084) (0.436) 
Anti 0.416 ** 0.401 0.402 0.408 ** 0.433 ** 0.436 ** 
(0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Pro and Anti 0.224 0.206 ** 0.210 0.221 ** 0.231 *• 0.244 ** 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.104) (0.102) (0.104) 
Pro and third-party 0.047 0.047 0.051 0.027 0.037 0.025 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102) (0.104) 
Anti and third-party 0.270 0.273 ** 0.277 ** 0.276 ** 0.281 ** 0.285 ** 
(0.105) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) 
All information 0.058 0.065 0.066 0.080 0.059 0.072 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.17 ** -0.17** -0.17 ** -0.14 ** -0.15** 













R2 .123 .164 .165 .175 .194 .200 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.11. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non-GM labeled tortiUa chips - double zero bids deleted 
(n-155, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.052 0.096 0.113 0.015 0.036 -0.007 
(0.091) (0.101) (0.110) (0.126) (0.110) (0.138) 
Anti 0.382 0.375 ** 0.377 ** 0.382 ** 0.399 0.403 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) (0.097) 
Pro and Anti 0.080 0.068 0.073 0.080 0.086 0.097 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) 
Pro and Third-party 0.036 0.032 0.036 0.009 0.023 0.010 
(0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) (0.135) (0.138) 
Anti and Third-party 0.212 0.208 0.215 0.210 0.217 0.224 
(0.135) (0.135) (0.137) (0.135) (0.135) (0.137) 
All information -0.047 -0.041 -0.037 -0.027 -0.043 -0.028 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.138) (0.140) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.083 -0.083 -0.084 -0.063 -0.067 













R2 .086 .092 .093 .010 .103 .108 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.12. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non- GM labeled vegetable oil—double zeroes deleted 
(n=I46, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.026 0.059 0.112 -0.114 -0.003 -0.098 
(0.118) (0.133) (0.140) (0.157) (0.142) (0.170) 
Anti 0.459 ** 0.427 ** 0.437 ** 0.437 ** 0.447 ** 0.461 ** 
(0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.166) (0.168) (0.167) 
Pro and Anti 0.241 0.214 0.239 0.236 0.230 0.269 
(0.170) (0.170) (0.172) (0.169) (0.171) (0.171) 
Pro and third-party 0.046 0.030 0.058 -0.025 0.018 -0.004 
(0.166) (0.166) (0.168) (0.167) (0.166) (0.169) 
Anti and third-party 0.290 0.258 0.288 0.245 0.269 0.283 
(0.176) (0.177) (0.179) (0.175) (0.177) (0.178) 
All information 0.142 0.136 0.153 0.164 0.125 0.169 
(0.172) (0.171) (0.172) (0.170) (0.171) (0.171) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.138 -0.135 ** -0.149 -0.116 -0.128 
(0.101) (0.100) (0.010) (0.102) (0.102) 
Gender -0.119 -0.109 
(0.103) (0.102) 
Income 0.0031 ** 0.0028 « 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Informed 0.127 0.097 
(0.105) (0.106) 
R2 .068 .081 .089 .107 .090 .120 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.13. OLS Estimates explaining difference in bid prices between GM-labeled and 
non-GM labeled potatoes - double zeroes excluded 
(n=159, standard errors are in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.041 0.065 0.077 -0.013 -0.017 -0.058 
(0.080) (0.087) (0.094) (0.106) (0.093) (0.114) 
Anti 0.420 ** 0.394 ** 0.396 •* 0.402 ** 0.425 ** 0.430 »* 
(0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) 
Pro and Anti 0.243 ** 0.212 * 0.218 * 0.227 0.233 ** 0.247 ** 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.111) (0.113) 
Pro and third-party 0.052 0.035 0.040 0.014 0.023 0.012 
(0.114) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.113) 
Anti and third- 0.291 ** 0.278 ** 0.285 ** 0.277 ** 0.286 ** 0.291 ** 
party 
(0.113) (0.111) (0.113) (0.111) (0.109) (0.111) 
All information 0.066 0.072 0.076 0.087 0.056 0.071 
(0.117) . (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.113) (0.114) 
Labels-Round 1 -0.179 ** -0.179 ** -0.183 ** -0.153 ** -0.157 ** 













R2 .123 .164 .165 .173 .195 .201 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8.14. Seemingly Unrdated Regression F-test results testing whether coefficients 
are the same across equations. 
(n=l72) 
Coefficient Numerator DF Denominator DF F Value 
Intercept 2 486 0.35 
Income 2 486 1.17 
Gender 2 486 0.82 
Informed 2 486 0.67 
All Four 8 486 0.73 
** indicates that a variable is significant at 1% 
* indicates that a variable is significant at 5% 
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Table 4.8.15. Value of third-party, independent information on genetically modified 
foods. 
A. Value to participants who receive positive information* 
Percent who switch to Value per Average value per 
GM switcher person 
Tortilla Chips -3.3% $0.108/bag $0.004/bag 
Vegetable Oil 15.4% $0.209/bottle $0.032/bottle 
Potatoes 3.3% $0.183/bag $0.006/bag 
B. Value to participants who receive negative information** 
Percent who switch to Value per Average value per 
GM switcher person 
Tortilla Chips 18.6% $0.250/bag $0.047/bag 
Vegetable Oil 28.2% $0.236/bottle $0.067/bottle 
Potatoes 25.0% $0.172/bag $0.043/bag 
C. Value to participants who receive both positive and negative information*** 
Percent who switch to Value per Average value per 
GM switcher person 
Tortilla Chips 8.7% $0.233/bag $0.020/bag 
Vegetable Oil 15.9% $0.276/bottle $0.043/bottle 
Potatoes 21.5% $0.293/bag $0.063/bag 
* On average, , more individuals purchased the GM-labeled potatoes and GM-labeled 
vegetable oil when they received positive and verifiable information as opposed to just 
getting positive information, but fewer individuals purchased the GM-labeled tortilla chips 
than their plain-labeled counterpart when they received positive and verifiable information. 
** Consumers who received negative and verifiable information were more accepting of 
GM foods than individuals who only received negative information 
*** Consumers who received positive, negative, and verifiable information were more 
accepting of GM foods than individuals who only received positive and negative information 
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Table 4.8.16. Value ofindependent information - test of higher and lower prices for 
Tortilla chips. 
A. Value to people who receive positive information* 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 








Value per person 
$0.001/bag 
$0.006/bag 
B. Value to people who receive negative information** 
Percent who switch to Value per 
GM switcher 
Larger discount for GM 12.3% $0.321/bag 
Smaller discount for GM 18.6% $0.165/bag 
Value per person 
$0.040Zbag 
$0.031/bag 
C. Value to people who receive both positive and negative information*** 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 












Table 4.8.17. Value of independent information - test of higher and lower prices for 
vegetable OIL 
A. Value to people who receive positive information* 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 












B. Value to people who receive negative information** 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 












C. Value to people who receive both positive and negative information*** 
Percent who switch to Value per Value per 
GM switcher person 
Larger discount for GM 19.9% $0.327/bag $0.065/bag 
Smaller discount for GM 6.9% $0.216/bottle $0.015/bottle 
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Table 4.8.18. Value ofindependent information — test of higher and lower prices for 
potatoes. 
A. Value to people who receive positive information* 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 












B. Value to people who receive negative information** 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 












C. Value to people who receive both positive and negative information*** 
Larger discount for GM 
Smaller discount for GM 













CHAPTER 5: ARE U.S. CONSUMERS TOLERANT OF GM FOODS? 
5.1. Introduction 
Consumers are reluctant to accept new food products they perceive as risky, which 
includes those products that involve some form of genetic modification (GM). GM foods 
remain controversial as some groups want GM foods banned (Greenpeace, 2001; Friends of 
the Earth, 2001); while others believe GM foods can help feed the world (Council for 
Biotechnology Education, 2001; Gates, 2001). But since a complete GM ban has thus far 
been politically infeasible, environmental and consumer groups have successfully lobbied for 
labeling of genetically modified foods in dozens of countries, including Australia, China, 
Japan, Korea, and member countries of the European Union. 
A key issue in the labeling debate is tolerance, the acceptable percentage of GM-
impurity. Counties have accepted positive tolerance standards because a zero tolerance 
standard is prohibitively costly, and a perfect segregation system can never be guaranteed 
(Shoemaker et al. 2001; Golan et al. 2002).1 
The United States currently does not require labeling of GM foods and does not have 
a positive tolerance standard. The question I address herein is how US consumers react to a 
positive tolerance standard for GM ingredients. Using the tools of statistical experimental 
design, an experimental auction is designed using three GM-products to test two hypotheses: 
(a) the mean consumer bids for the GM-free product equals the mean bid for the GM-
threshold products, set either at 1% or 5%; and (b) the mean bids for the 1%-GM-product 
equals the mean bids for the 5%-GM-product.2 The results suggest that one can reject the 
first hypothesis (a) but not the second one (b). My results suggest that consumers reduce 
their demand by about 10% relative to the certain baseline, irrespective of whether the GM-
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threshold is set at 1 or 5 %. This then suggests a policy direction—if a tolerance level is to 
be used in the US, a 5%-GM threshold is likely to be more efficient than a 1%-GM threshold 
because the 5% level is less costly to meet and demand reduction is independent of the 
tolerance level. 
5.2. Experimental Design 
One previous study has examined the willingness to pay for GM foods with different 
tolerance thresholds. Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2002) conducted experimental auctions 
using consumers in France and found that consumers valued biscuits with a 1% and a 0.1% 
tolerance threshold differently (they also were bidding on non-GM and GM biscuits - 4 
biscuits total). Their results also found that consumers did not appear to think that 0.1% GM 
or 1% GM content was as good as a GM free product. One problem with their experimental 
design is that they were selling consumers four different biscuits that were, in their words, 
close substitutes. Selling four close substitutes leads to demand reduction by consumers 
perceiving the potential of obtaining multiple units (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000) which 
could potentially cause a confounding problem where one does not know if bid reduction is 
due to genetic modification or demand reduction. 
Consumers bid on three food products that differed by the tolerance labels on the 
foods. All consumers bid on foods with a non-GM label certified to be completely free of 
genetically engineered material in one trial, and in the other trial consumers bid on foods 
with a non-GM-label indicating that a certain percentage genetically modified material, either 
1% or 5%, was tolerated. These specific tolerance threshold levels are of particular 
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importance as they match up with the current European and Japanese standards and would be 
the likely tolerance choices of the United States should a standard be enacted. 
The experimental design has two treatments. The treatments are randomly assigned 
to three experimental units. The GM-food products were introduced for the next two rounds 
of bidding. The two bidding rounds were differentiated by the food label—either a non-GM 
label certified to be GM-free or a non-GM label that indicated the tolerance of GM material 
(see Figure 5.6.1.). In one round (which could be round 1 or 2 depending on experimental 
unit), participants bid on the three food products each with the certified non-GM food label. 
In the other round, participants bid on the same three food products with the 1% or 5%-GM 
food tolerance levels. 
5.3. Results 
Two main results emerge from this experiment. First, consumers reduced their 
demand for the products having GM-tolerance levels relative to the GM-free benchmark. 
Table 5.6.2. shows the mean and median bids by food type. Twenty-eight participants bid in 
the 5% tolerance treatments; sixteen participants bid in the 1% tolerance treatment. Overall, 
the mean consumer bid less on the food product with the GM-tolerance labels relative to the 
GM-free products. Consumers bid 7 cents less on the GM-tolerant oil, 14 cents less on the 
tortilla chips, and 9 cents less on the potatoes.3 Consumers discounted the foods with the 
GM-tolerance by an average of 7 to 13 percent. This is a significant demand reduction for 
1%- and 5%-GM products. In comparison, the results in chapter 4 show that consumers 
discounted GM-labeled food by an average of 14 percent that had a GM-label without a 
tolerance level. Pooling all observations,4 table 5.6.3. shows one can reject the null 
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hypothesis that bidding behavior over GM-tolerance labels is identical to that for the GM-
free benchmark for the tortilla chips and the potatoes, and not for the vegetable oil.5 
Consider the 1% and 5%-GM treatment separately, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
bids different for 5 of 6 products.6 The significant discount for the GM-tolerant food is 
consistent with Viscusi et al. (1987) findings. In that study, consumers initially purchased a 
given product when told that it injured 15 out of 10,000 who used the product, but over two-
thirds of the consumers were unwilling to purchase the same product when the chance of 
injury increased to 16 out of 10,000. This indicates a strong reference risk effect, which 
could help explain why consumers placed such a large discount on the GM-tolerant food. 
Second, consumers discounted the 5%-GM products by the same amount as they 
discounted the 1%-GM food. Table 5.6.4. shows that at the 5 percent significance level one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that demand reduction is independent of the GM tolerance 
level. This supports the view that if a GM-tolerance policy is enacted in the US, consumers 
might not place a greater value on a 1%-GM relative to a 5%-GM tolerance. Because of the 
higher segregation and handling cost of a 1% tolerance threshold compared to a threshold of 
5%, society may be better off implementing a higher tolerance threshold. Consumers value 
GM-free products, but if GM contamination does exist, the marginal willingness to pay to 
avoid more contamination, from 1% to 5%, are small. 
This result is consistent with the theory of surrogate bidding (for a good review see 
Shogren, forthcoming). This is where consumers reveal the same willingness to pay to avoid 
varying levels of contamination. Surrogate bidding has been shown to exist in other food 
markets. Hayes et al. (1995) used experimental auctions to show that consumer bids to 
reduce risk by eliminating a cluster of foodbome pathogens were indistinguishable from bids 
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to reduce specific pathogens. Using a survey, Hammitt and Graham (1999) found the same 
result, that consumers were insensitive to probabilities. 
5.4. Conclusion 
In the experimental treatments, consumers reduce their demand by an average of 7%-
13% for each food product with a 1% and 5% tolerance for GM-material relative to GM-free 
food. I found no evidence, however, that consumers value a food with a 1%-GM tolerance 
greater than a food with a 5%-GM tolerance. These results support the notion that if the 
United States decides to allow a tolerance of GM material in food products, the 5% tolerance 
would be best socially. This occurs because consumers do not value a 1% tolerance more, 
and it is less expensive for food producers to comply with a higher tolerance level. 
Consumers were willing to pay a large premium to avoid contamination in an 
uncontaminated product but were not willing to pay to reduce contamination in a product that 
already had a small amount of contamination. An interesting extension of this work would 
be to see if this result generalizes to other products by examining the marginal willingness to 
avoid small amounts of contamination in other products. If this result generalizes to a broad 
range of products this would have a significant influence on many aspects of environmental 
policy. For instance, it would help explain the fierce opposition to drilling in the Alaska 
Wildlife area. It would also indicate that if proponents of drilling were initially successful in 
getting a small amount of oil drilling, it would be easier to convince the public to further 
increase drilling over time. 
Future research remains to be done. More information is needed on the cost of 
producing non-GM crops at different tolerance levels. Also, this project could be replicated 
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internationally to provide evidence on the efficiency of GM-tolerance policies in foreign 
countries, e.g. Europe and Japan. Trading across countries would be easier if all countries 
maintained the same tolerance. If research could show that consumers have similar values 
for tolerance levels across countries, this research could be useful for better understanding 
whether uniform GM-tolerance standards across countries makes sense. 
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5.5. Notes 
1. While no literature currently exists on the costs of a low tolerance for GM foods, Klein 
and Brester (1997) estimated the cost for a zero-tolerance directive for beef packing 
companies. They found that zero-tolerance beef directive might cost society over $3 
billion dollars annually. 
2. Note some argue it is impossible to claim that a product is 100% GM-free, saying that 
more accurate testing equipment would detect GM material on almost any food that was 
made, even non-GM foods. This auction sold foods that were tested and found to not 
contain GM material - thus the food product in the auctions were certified to have no GM 
content. 
3. Table 2 also shows that consumers bidding on 5%-GM tolerance discounted the oil by 6 
cents, the tortilla chips by 9 cents, and the potatoes by 7 cents. Consumers bidding on 
1%-GM tolerance discounted the vegetable oil by 9 cent, the tortilla chips by 25 cents, 
and the potatoes by 12 cents. T-tests could not reject the null hypothesis that the bids for 
the non-GM foods differed across treatments - this is a good consistency check and does 
not reject the hypothesis that the bidding behavior was reasonable. Between 32%-41% of 
consumers bid less for the GM-tolerance food - the percentage varies by food product. 
4. Because the participants in the three separate treatments were independent of each other, 
one can pool the data to test whether consumers discounted the GM-tolerant food. 
5. I also ran Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests and the results were similar — the bids on the 
vegetable oil were not statistically different at any conventional significance level, the 
bids for the tortilla chips were significantly different at the five percent level, and the bids 
for the potatoes were significantly different at the fifteen percent level. 
I l l  
6. I also ran several regressions to test if demographic characteristics, like consumer's 
gender, household income, race, or age could explain the difference in bids for the 
certified non-GM labeled food and the GM-tolerant food. No demographic characteristic 
has a statistically significant impact on the difference in bids. 
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5.6. Figures and Tables 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 fl. oz. 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
* This product is certified to BE FREE OF ANY 
GM-material. 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 fl. oz. 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
* Subject to a 1% tolerance, that is up to 
1% of any ingredient could be genetically 
engineered. 
Vegetable Oil 
Net weight 32 fl. oz. 
This product is made without 
genetic engineering * 
* Subject to a 5% tolerance, that is up to 
5% of any ingredient could be genetically 
engineered. 
Figure 5.6.1. The three types of labels usedfor the tortilla chips 
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Table 5.6.2. Mean Bids 
A. Mean bids — all participants 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
OIL 44 0.99 0.92 0.75 0 3.50 
OIL-TOL 44 0.92 0.76 0.75 0 2.50 
CHIPS 44 1.13 0.99 0.82 0 5.00 
CHIPS - TOL 44 0.99 0.80 0.75 0 3.49 
POTATOES 44 0.95 0.71 0.89 0 3.00 
POTATOES-TOL 44 0.86 0.67 0.84 0 3.00 
B. Mean bids when participants bid on food with a 5% tolerance level. 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
OIL 28 0.94 0.81 0.75 0 3.00 
OIL-TOL 28 0.88 0.71 0.68 0 2.50 
CHIPS 28 0.99 0.77 0.75 0 3.00 
CHIPS - TOL 28 0.90 0.69 0.73 0 2.00 
POTATOES 28 0.83 0.64 0.75 0 3.00 
POTATOES-TOL 28 0.76 0.65 0.75 0 3.00 
C. Mean bids when participants bid on food with a 1% tolerance level. 
n mean bid std. dev. Median Minimum Maximum 
OIL 16 1.06 1.12 0.75 0 3.50 
OIL-TOL 16 0.97 0.85 0.88 0 2.39 
CHIPS 16 1.38 1.28 1.13 0 5.00 
CHIPS - TOL 16 1.13 0.98 0.77 0 3.49 
POTATOES 16 1.15 0.81 1.00 0 3.00 
POTATOES-TOL 16 1.03 0.69 0.99 0 2.00 
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Table 5.6 J. T TEST - Non-GM foods with and without GM tolerance levels 
A. T-Test on whether difference in bids are different - all observations (N=44). 
Bid Non-GM Bid w/ tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 0.99 0.92 0.07 1.24 
Chips 1.13 0.99 0.14 2.44** 
Potatoes 0.95 0.86 0.09 1.70* 
B. T-Test on whether difference in bids are different — 5% tolerance (N=28). 
Bid Non-GM Bid w/ tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 0.94 0.88 0.06 1.05 
Chips 0.99 0.90 0.09 1.51 
Potatoes 0.83 0.76 0.07 1.33 
C. T-Test on whether difference in bids are different -1% tolerance (N=16). 
Bid Non-GM Bid w/ tolerance Difference T-Test Statistic 
Oil 1.06 0.97 0.09 0.71 
Chips 1.38 1.13 0.25 1.93 * 
Potatoes 1.15 1.03 0.12 1.08 
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Table 5.6.4. T-Test on whether consumers value foods with a 1% tolerance differently 
than foods with a 5% tolerance. 
N=44 
Non-GM Non-GM Difference T-Test 
Premium - 5% Premium -1% Statistic 
Oil 0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.20 
Chips 0.09 0.25 -0.16 -1.33 
Potatoes 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.47 
116 
CHAPTER 6: NEGATIVE INFORMATION AND RESISTANCE 
TO ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
6.1. Introduction 
The standard of living in developed countries grew considerably in the twentieth 
century. One reason has been the steady introduction of new goods that result from research 
and development. The standard of living for the U.S. population has increased during the 
past century due to the invention and adoption of many new goods (and services). Because 
of new technology, goods have improved in quality and new goods have been introduced, 
both have increased welfare. New goods and quality improvements have caused a major 
revision of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI was biased upwards by approximately 
0.6 percent per year (Boskin et al. 1998), and estimates of increases in the prices of 
individuals goods have also been shown to be biased upwards by ignoring the effect of new 
products (Hausman, 1996). This bias estimate could be thought of as a lower bound on how 
much better off consumers are due to the introduction of new goods - which means that new 
goods and services alone led to an almost doubling of welfare in the twentieth century. 
Not all new goods, however, have resulted in consumers being better off with the 
consumption of the new good relative to the consumption of the pre-existing good, e.g. the 
Ford Edsile and Chevy Corvaire, were major flops as consumer goods. Also, there has been 
major resistance by consumers to the use of electricity generated by nuclear power and to 
eating irradiated meat (Fox et al). The two latter examples are somewhat surprising because 
it is generally cheaper to produce electricity by nuclear power than by coal or oil fired 
generating plants. Irradiated pork is free form hazardous to human health causing bacteria. 
The good attributes not withstanding, these latter goods have not been able to overcome the 
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bad negative image of nuclear energy created by environmental groups like Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth. In the United States, these groups helped increase the public's risk 
perception of nuclear power, forcing stringent safety standards to be enacted that contributed 
to a quadrupling of plant costs in just more than a decade (Ruttan, 2001). No new nuclear 
power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978. 
Because the consequences for not adopting newer, better technologies can be great, 
future generations of Europeans may be worse off by the actions of the current generation. 
This chapter examines the demographic and market characteristics that would push a 
consumer to resist genetically modified foods, with special attention given to the role of 
negative information and verifiable information. This chapter has two key results. First, 
negative information on genetically modified foods pushes some consumers out of the 
market for GM-labeled foods, where they do not have demand at a price of zero. Second, a 
third party source providing verifiable information dampens the effectiveness of negative 
information and causes consumers to be more likely to be in the market for GM-labeled 
foods. This question has tremendous importance, because if negative infoimation can stymie 
socially useful technology adoption, groups that do not want new products introduced would 
have an incentive to disseminate negative information on a broad range of new goods, not 
just genetic modified foods. Fox et al. (2001) showed that negative information from 
environmental groups can significantly decrease the demand for a new product — if the 
environmental groups can get consumers to perceive the new product as risky. They 
discussed that allowing environmental groups to speak freely about these products may lower 
overall welfare, if newer, more efficient products and technologies are not developed due to 
negative information. 
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6.2. Background on Technology Adoption 
New planting technologies are adopted first in areas where they are most profitable 
(Griliches, 1957 and 1960). For hybrid com, the technology was first adopted in the high 
quality planting areas that allowed the greatest increase in yield. When one thinks about a 
new technology that is controversial like genetic modification, it seems logical that most of 
the early adoption takes place in areas where the good is least controversial (expected 
demand is largest). United States consumers worry about genetic modification far less than 
consumers in many other countries do, which explains why much of the initial planting of 
GM crops took place in the United States. 
Adoption of new technology does not always occur because of price reasons. Green 
et al. (1996) showed that for irrigation technology, physical and agronomic characteristics 
are more important factors for adoption than price. One of the main benefits of genetic 
modification is that it makes farming easier—as pest resistant crops require fewer hassles. 
However, if demand were lower for the product that uses the newer technology, adoption of 
the new technology would not necessarily make farming easier and this could lead to lower 
adoption rates. 
Uncertainty is likely to decrease the probability of adopting new investments, if the 
decision is irreversible (Dixit and Pinkyck, 1994; Purvis et al. 1995). The decision to plant 
GM crops is at least partially irreversible, as once a field is planted with genetically modified 
crops, traces of genetic modification are likely to persist for several years into the future, 
even if the farmer returns to planting conventional (non-GM) seeds. If a group can increase 
the uncertainty about the success or the risks of a new technology, adoption of that 
technology may be slowed, or possibly reversed as with nuclear power in the U.S. This 
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reasoning would provide incentives for environmental groups to oppose genetic modification 
by disseminating negative - possibly erroneous - information, even if their information is 
highly biased. 
Klotz et al. (1995) examined the role of information in technology adoption regarding 
rbST. First, they showed that immediate adoption of the new technology might not be 
optimal, due to the option value of waiting. In general, adoption will occur when the 
expected returns from adoption equals the expected value of waiting and having the option to 
adopt in the next period. In addition, they found as farmers become more informed about 
rbST, they became more negative about it. They concluded that farmers might have been 
worried about an adverse consumer reaction. 
A certain level of information is thought to be required before a farmer is ready to 
adopt a new technology (Feder and Slade, 1984). Thus, in general, larger farms, those with 
access to better information, or those with higher human capital are more likely to adopt a 
new technology first. When negative information is available on a new technology, however, 
like the information made available by environmental groups, it is not known how human 
capital will affect the adoption decision. 
Negative information provided by environmental groups is likely to contribute to 
farmers and consumers resisting GM technology. This could happen for many reasons and 
one reason is that when consumers are given negative information, many will not buy GM-
labeled foods at any price. This could help explain why in Europe, where environmental 
groups are more vocal, adoption of GM technology is much slower than in the United States. 
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63. Empirical Model 
This chapter follows the state-dependent utility specification in chapter 4, where a 
consumer compares his/her perceived expected utility (henceforth, utility) from consuming 
GM-labeled foods and plain-labeled foods. Equation (1) shows the state-dependent utility 
function for a consumer who purchases GM-labeled food, called labeled. Equation (2) is 
his/her utility for a purchase of plain-labeled foods, called non-labeled. 
As in chapter 4, consumer / s income is w, and m is the monetary premium he/she pays for 
the non-labeled food (the premium can be positive, negative, or zero). Consumer J obtains 
u t i l i t y  U J  i f  t h e  g o o d  s t a t e  o c c u r s ,  a n d  V 1  i f  t h e  b a d  s t a t e  o c c u r s ,  w h e r e  U 1  > V J  >  0 .  
Assume the bad state occurs when either consumer j becomes ill or a bad 
environmental outcome occurs (e.g., genetic crossbreeding). Let and be 
consumer/'s perceived probability that the GM-labeled food and plain-labeled food will 
yield the good state. Assume information the consumer has on genetic modification, 
I ~ (- oo, oo) affects the perceived probability that GM-labeled food will result in a good 
state. A positive / indicates the consumer has received positive or favorable information on 
GM foods; a negative / indicates the consumer has received negative or less favorable 
information on GM foods. When a consumer gets positive information on GM foods, / 
increases and the consumer perceives greater utility and greater marginal utility from GM-
labeled foods. The information a consumer receives in the experiments is randomly 
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assigned, and can differ among participants. The consumer's perceived probability of a good 
outcome from plain-labeled food does not depend on information about GM foods. 
The probability that a consumer will never purchase GM-labeled foods is the 
probability that the utility from GM-labeled foods is smaller than the utility from plain-
labeled food at all feasible prices (for any possible monetary premium m for non-GM foods), 
as shown in equation 3: 
(3) P(MK j  = 1) = PiEUi^(w)-EUJmon_labded(w-m)<0] VmeM. 
on 
(3a) P(UK' =f> = PlpLu(l)U'{w)+(l-plUtl(l)y j{»)-
PL-n*<yi(K-'")<0] VmeAf. 
Where MKJ = 1 if consumer j is out of the market for GM-labeled foods, and equals 0 
otherwise. Mis the set of all feasible monetary premiums m on non-labeled foods. Standard 
comparative statics show that an increase in positive information increases the consumer's 
likelihood of consuming GM-labeled foods by increasing the expected utility of GM-labeled 






An increase in the likelihood of consuming GM-labeled foods decreases the probability that 




dP{M' - 0) 
EUiMed(\v)-EUim_lal)tled(w-m) < 0 
<0 ÔI dl 
Conversely, and perhaps more importantly, negative information will increase the probability 
that a consumer is out of the market for GM-labeled foods. 
6.4. Econometric Model 
A consumer is considered out of the market for genetically modified food if they do 
not demand one unit of a GM-labeled food product at any price. Let a consumer be out of 
the market if Afy =1. To examine the impact information and demographic characteristics 
have on the probability of being out of the market for genetically modified foods; a probit 
model is used, and is shown in the following equation: 
6) Prob(Af,.=l)= <&(/?'AT). 
Where X is the matrix of exogenous characteristics for consumers and f$ is the associated 
vector of coefficients, and O is the cdf for the normal distribution. 
The probability of being "out of the market," i.e. the probability that Afy = 1, is 
assumed to be the probability that the consumer bids zero for one unit of the genetically 
modified food. If a consumer does not have a positive willingness to pay for one unit of a 
genetically modified food when they have a positive demand for their non-GM counterpart, 
this provides strong evidence that they will not consume the genetically modified variety of 
the product at any price. Determining what impacts the probability of being out of the 
market is important, because if a large share of consumers bid a non-positive amount for one 
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unit of consumption, the grocery store will discontinue displaying/stocking/supplying the 
food. 
An alternative definition of being "out of the market" will also be used. All 
individuals who participated in the auctions bid on both GM-labeled and plain-labeled food 
products. If the price an individual bids for the GM-labeled food is less than or equal to 2/3 
of the price they bid for the plain-labeled food, then they will also be considered out of the 
market. This seems realistic because most premiums for non-GM foods do not exceed 
twenty percent. 
The probit model in equation 6 will be estimated for the three products used in the 
experiments - Russet potatoes, vegetable oil, and tortilla chips. In this model I examine the 
contribution of a set of factors, including anti-GM information from environmental groups 
and verifiable information from a third party on the probability that a consumer bids zero for 
GM food (when they otherwise bid positive amounts). In addition, equation 6 will estimate 
the probability that a consumer is out of the market for all 3 food products. This is the 
probability that a consumer bid zero for every GM-labeled food product for the initial 
specification, or bid 2/3's or less of their bid for each plain-labeled product in the alternative 
specification. 
6.5. Results 
Table 6.7.1. shows the percentage of participants who bid zero for the GM-labeled 
commodities. The number of observations differs, because if an individual bids zero for both 
the GM-labeled and plain-labeled versions of a commodity, they are not included in the 
analysis (they just did not demand the product, and one cannot determine their taste for 
genetic modification). Similarly, when reporting on who is out of the market for all GM-
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labeled foods, those who bid zero for all the food products are not included. In the sample of 
consumers, ten percent did not place a positive bid for any of the GM-labeled products. For 
the individual goods, almost nine percent of consumers bid zero for the vegetable oil, while 
over twelve percent of consumers bid zero for the potatoes and tortilla chips. The likely 
reason why more consumers were willing to purchase GM-labeled vegetable oil is because 
vegetable oil is a refined product such that all the GM protein is removed. Thus, consumers 
who consume GM oil would not be harmed even if genetic modification was found to be 
harmful. 
Table 6.7.2. reports a summary of outcomes for the alternative measure of being out 
of the market; consumers whose bid for the GM-labeled food is less than or equal to 2/3 of 
their bid for the plain-labeled food. Using this definition, over 16% of consumers would not 
purchase any of the GM-labeled foods. For the individual commodities, the percentage who 
are out of the market ranges from 19% to almost 24%, with fewer consumers being out of the 
market for vegetable oil. 
Results from probit regressions are shown in tables 6.7.3. - 6.7.10. In tables 6.7.3. -
6.7.6., the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the consumer bids zero for the GM-
labeled food. In tables 6.7.7-6.7.10. the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the 
consumer's bid for the GM-labeled food is less than or equal to 2/3 of their bid for the plain-
labeled variety. Exogenous attributes of consumers are hypothesized to affect the probability 
that consumers will be out of the market for GM-labeled foods. 
Negative information from environmental groups increases the probability that a 
consumer will be out of the market for GM-labeled foods. The coefficient is always positive 
and is statistically significant for many of the model specifications. This indicates that 
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negative information from environmental groups will increase the probability a prospective 
consumer out of the market for GM-labeled foods. 
This result has important implications. If an anti-technology group wishes to slow 
progress, they could disseminate large amounts of negative information - even if the 
information is highly biased. They could even disguise true intentions of wishing to keep a 
new product from coming to the market by telling consumers they want to keep everybody 
"fully informed" of the consequences of a product or technology. Yet, their negative 
information could help push demand down to zero for enough people that suppliers would 
not find it profitable to invest in the new technology. Also, even if firms do not fully believe 
the information, and they are not certain that consumers will believe the negative 
information, negative information will increase the uncertainty about genetic modification, 
which has been shown to decrease the likelihood of adoption. Given that technological 
change is one of the driving forces behind the rising standard of living enjoyed in many 
developed countries, stalled progress could decrease welfare significantly over time. 
This result also presents an alternative explanation for why Europeans demand for 
GM foods is so small. Many have hypothesized that Europeans dislike GM foods because of 
food scares like BSE, dioxin, and foot and mouth disease. This presents an alternative 
explanation for why Europeans demand is so low - environmental groups are more prevalent 
and have pushed demand down to zero for many consumers. 
Positive information from agribusiness companies decreases the probability that an 
individual will be out of the market for GM-labeled foods. The coefficients are consistently 
negative, and statistically significant for many model specifications. If a consumer receives 
positive information, they are more likely to purchase GM-labeled foods. This helps explain 
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why the biotechnology industry has formed a coalition called the Council of Biotechnology 
Information, a group that provides positive information on biotechnology. 
Third party, verifiable information decreases the probability that an individual is out 
of the market, as these coefficients are negative under all of the model specifications, and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level in many cases. This provides evidence that a third 
party source that provides neutral, verifiable information on genetically modified foods could 
help prevent the market from disappearing due to lack of demand. So in addition to value 
that verifiable information may have by providing consumers accurate information on the 
risks and benefits of genetic modification, it could have additional benefits by keeping new 
products available by increasing the probability that the consumer will bid be in the market 
for GM-labeled foods. 
An increase in household income may increase the probability that a consumer is out 
of the market for GM-labeled foods. The coefficients on household income are consistently 
positive, however not statistically significant at a 10% level of significance. Thus, the effect 
of household income on increasing the probability of a consumer being out of the market 
cannot be determined with any conventional degree of certainty. 
"Labels" is a dummy variable that equals one if the consumer said that he/she often or 
always reads food labels before they purchase a food product for the first time (as recorded 
on the pre-auction survey). The coefficient for labels is consistently positive, and is 
statistically significant (5% level) for many of the model specifications. This result indicates 
that consumers who usually read labels are more likely to be out of the market for a new 
(risky) food product than consumers who do not read food labels are. 
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"Informed" is a dummy variable that equals one if the consumer considers himself or 
herself at least somewhat informed about genetically modified foods (as recorded on the pre-
auction survey). Those who considered themselves informed on GM foods are more likely to 
be out of the market, suggesting that they have heard negative information on GM foods. 
This result suggests the anti-biotechnology coalition has been doing a better job of 
disseminating negative messages than the pro-biotechnology coalition has been doing 
disseminating positive messages. 
6.6. Conclusion 
Technology adoption and use have dramatically increased the welfare of U.S. 
consumers over time. For future generations to enjoy a higher standard of living than the 
current generation, it is imperative that the adoption of new technologies continues. Hence, 
factors that cause the adoption or non-adoption of new products are particularly important. 
This paper examined the factors that increase the probability that consumers are out of the 
market for genetically modified foods, which could stymie the adoption of genetically 
modified crops by farmers. 
Results from experimental auctions show two key results. First, when participants 
receive negative information on genetically modified foods, they are more likely to be "out 
of the market" for GM-labeled foods, i.e. these consumers will not buy GM foods at any 
positive price. In Europe, where negative information from environmental groups on GM 
foods is more prevalent, adoption of genetically modified crops has stalled. Many have said 
that this is because of food safety scandals like BSE (human form of mad cow disease) or the 
dioxin scandal in Belgium, but this paper presents an alternative explanation for Europeans 
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reluctance to adopt genetically modified foods. The second result is that a third party source 
providing verifiable information can soften the effect of negative information and help keep 
consumers in the market for GM-labeled foods. This shows a value to verifiable information 
in addition to the value it has in providing consumers accurate information (Rousu et al. 
2002). 
The implications of this finding are great If a group wants to stall technological 
progress, they could supply negative information to consumers and producers. This will 
contribute to the resistance of the adoption of new technologies. This could lower the overall 
welfare of society by preventing the adoption of social welfare improving new technologies. 
This presents an interesting dilemma that I will not try to answer: Should interested parties be 
allowed freedom of speech to disseminate welfare reducing negative information? This can 
happen when there are significant information asymmetries in society as there are with the 
introduction of new goods into the market. Future research to examine the specific value 
verifiable information has in keeping consumers in the market for GM foods and therefore 
allowing more efficient innovations to be adopted could be quite valuable. 
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6.7. Tables 
Table 6.7.1. Percentage of consumers who bid zero for a GM-labeled food item. 
(When a consumer bids zero for both GM and non-GM version of a 
commodity their bids are not included) 
Observations Out of market Percent out of market 
All goods 165 17 10.3% 
Vegetable Oil, only 146 13 8.9% 
Tortilla Chips, only 155 20 12.9% 
Potatoes, only 159 20 12.6% 
Table 6.7.2. Percentage of consumers who's bid for the GM-labeled food is 2/3's the 
amount they bid for the plain labeled food, or lower. 
(When a consumer bids zero for both GM and non-GM version of a 
commodity their bids are not included) 
Observations Out of market Percent out of market 
All goods 165 27 16.4% 
Vegetable Oil, only 146 28 19.2% 
Tortilla Chips, only 155 37 23.9% 
Potatoes, only 159 35 22.0% 
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Table 6.7.3. Probit model: Tortilla Chips 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is ont of the market for tortilla 
chips (Le. bid - 0) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.435 -1.931 -1.876 -1.542 •* -2.295 ** -2.196** 
(0.437) (0.557) (0.513) (0.460) (0.613) (0.615) 
Antiinfo 0.670 * 0.791 * 0.748 * 0.692 * 0.857 ** 0.874 ** 
(0.394) (0.410) (0.409) (0.401) (0.044) (0.429) 
Pro_info -0.360 -0.334 -0.318 -0.400 -0.312 -0.321 





















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.4. Probit model: Potatoes 
Dependent variable -1 if a consumer is out of the market for potatoes 
(ie. bid = 0) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.228 ** -1.479 ** -1.749 ** -1.438 ** -1.985 ** -1.916** 
(0.441) (0.554) (0.526) (0.473) (0.628) (0.632) 
Antiinfo 0.496 0.562 0.587 0.512 0.620 0.623 
(0.400) (0.411) (0.415) (0.417) (0.436) (0.437) 
Proinfo -0.550 * -0.525 * -0.507 -0.659 ** -0.593 * -0.604* 





















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.5. Probit model: Vegetable Oil 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is out of the market for vegetable 
oil (Le. bid = 0) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.652 *» -1.936 -2.313 -1.747 -2.516 ** -2.499 
(0.530) (0.645) (0.652) (0.552) (0.741) (0.756) 
Antiinfo 0.698 0.761 0.797 0.704 0.840 0.836 
(0.483) (0.493) (0.510) (0.493) (0.523) (0.523) 
Proinfo -0.418 -0.397 -0.367 -0.471 -0.384 -0.383 























Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.6. Probit model: All products 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is out of the market for all three 
products (Le. bid = 0) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.262 -1.673 ** -1.818 -1.443 ** -2.190 ** -2.090 
(0.449) (0.567) (0.540) (0.479) (0.645) (0.649) 
Antiinfo 0.395 0.493 0.461 0.410 0.537 0.543 
(0.406) (0.420) (0.525) (0.421) (0.445) (0.446) 
Proinfo -0.549 * -0.521 -0.525 -0.644* -0.580 * -0.590 * 
(0.320) (0.324) (0.330) (0.335) (0.345) (0.347) 






















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.7. Probit model: Tortilla Chips - alternative specification 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is out of the market for Tortilla 
Chips (bid is 2/3's of bid for plain-labeled chips) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.689 ** -1.083 ** -0.704* -0.876 -1.111** -1.057 ** 
(0.346) (0.441) (0.376) (0.366) (0.461) (0.463) 
Antiinfo 0.358 0.451 0.360 0.389 0.458 0.460 
(0.299) (0.308) (0.299) (0.305) (0.313) (0.312) 
Proinfo -0.450 * -0.426 -0.448 * -0.501 * -0.492 * -0.489 * 





















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.8. Probit model: Potatoes - alternative specification 
Dependent variable = I if a consumer is out of the market for Potatoes 
(bid is 2/3's of bid for plain-labeled chips) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.014 -0.972 ** -1.068 ** -1.238 ** -1.087 ** -0.962 * 
(0.384) (0.482) (0.425) (0.413) (0.518) (0.529) 
Antiinfo 0.742 0.731 ** 0.752 0.789 0.753 ** 0.820 ** 
(0.344) (0.353) (0.367) (0.357) (0.364) (0.376) 
Pro_info -0.570 ** -0.575 ** -0.565 ** -0.638 ** -0.659 ** -0.694 ** 
(0.264) (0.266) (0.264) (0.270) (0.274) (0.282) 






















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.9. Probit model: Vegetable Oil - alternative specification 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is ont of the market for vegetable 
oil (bid is 2/3's of bid for plain-labeled chips) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.248 ** -1.496 -1.200 ** -1.392 -1.484 ** -1.378 ** 
(0.396) (0.489) (0.430) (0.416) (0.513) (0.518) 
Antiinfo 0.778 0.829 ** 0.772 ** 0.791 ** 0.822 ** 0.864 ** 
(0.347) (0.353) (0.348) (0.352) (0.357) (0.366) 
Proinfo -0.327 -0.302 -0.334 -0.368 -0.369 -0.359 
(0.280) (0.283) (0.282) (0.284) (0.289) (0.297) 






















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6.7.10. Probit model: All Products - alternative specification 
Dependent variable = 1 if a consumer is out of the market for All three 
products (bid is 2/3's of bid for plain-labeled chips) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
N=172 
Repressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -1.198 ** -1.223 -1.174 -1.364 -1.258 ** -1.108 
(0.421) (0.515) (0.456) (0.447) (0.543) (0.550) 
Antiinfo 0.718 * 0.724 * 0.714 * 0.751 * 0.735 * 0.786 * 
(0.384) (0.391) (0.384) (0.394) (0.400) (0.408) 
Pro_info -0.613 ** -0.611 ** -0.619 ** -0.667 ** -0.687 ** -0.721 ** 
(0.280) (0.281) (0.280) (0.285) (0.289) (0.298) 




















Significant at the 5% level 
Significant at the 10% level 
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CHAPTER 7: WHO DO CONSUMERS TRUST FOR INFORMATION ON 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: ECONOMICS OF TASTE FORMATION 
7.1. Introduction 
The information on genetically modified (GM) foods is wide ranging. On the 
extreme ends of the spectrum, Agribusiness firms describe GM food as "food to feed the 
planet," while environmental companies describe GM food as "frankenfood" (Gates, 2001). 
Other organizations, such as the U.S. government, are more moderate in their description of 
GM foods. The information provided by these groups is designed to influence the 
consumer's perception of genetically modified foods. Environmental groups started their 
campaign relatively early attempting to expose the potential dangers of GM foods, with a 
campaign calling GM foods unnatural and stating that GM foods are made by large, 
multinational, companies. Environmental groups also claim that GM labels are needed 
because consumers have the right to know if their food is GM (Friends of the Earth 2001, 
Greenpeace 1997). The campaign by environmental groups was at least partially successful, 
as many countries have adopted mandatory GM labeling policies, and the European Union 
enacted a moratorium on approvals of GM foods in 1998. 
To combat the negative publicity environmental groups were giving GM foods; 
several agribusiness firms formed the Council of Biotechnology Information. The Council 
for Biotechnology Education produced a website, made TV commercials, and even made a 
children's coloring book all to try to promote the positive aspects of GM foods. This group 
has been relatively successful in the United States, where there is little political support for 
mandatory labeling of GM foods (Hoban, 2002,1997). 
139 
These groups need the public's trust for their information to be effective. Both the 
biotechnology industry and environmental groups have spent considerable amounts of time 
and money attempting to influence consumer behavior. A key question is which people 
would trust the agribusiness firms and who would trust the environmental groups. Further, 
what other groups would consumers trust? The Government? A third party group? No one? 
People who are closer in social status are more likely to place trust in one another 
(Glaeser et al. 2000). For example, individuals who were raised with a particular religious 
upbringing would place more trust in those who were also raised by the same religion, ceteris 
paribus. 
Becker (1998) discusses the importance of personal and social capital in accounting 
for a consumer's taste. Personal capital is defined as capital that the individual personally 
acquires, such as schooling, habits, or experience. Social capital is defined as the capital that 
the individual acquires by his/her surroundings, upbringings, and social network. Becker 
shows that when personal and social capital are considered in economic models, many 
previously mysterious outcomes, like addictions and advertising, can be explained by 
economic theory. 
This paper explores the foundations of trust; specifically looking at the case of 
information on genetically modified foods. Special attention is paid to the formation of trust, 
and the factors that cause a consumer to trust one source of information more than others. A 
simple model is developed, examining the role of personal capital and social capital in the 
formation of trust. Then, results from a survey are analyzed using a multinomial logit model, 
to determine what characteristics would cause individuals to trust one source of information 
more than another source. 
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7.2. The Model 
Consider the strictly quasi-concave utility function shown in equation 1 : 
1) U =U{XlaMed,XHon_laMed\Tl,..TJ). 
Utility is based on the consumption of two choice variables, GM-Iabeled foods and foods that 
are not labeled as GM (henceforth plain-labeled foods). The utility of these two goods is 
affected by the consumer's trust of information from J sources. This information differs in 
quality for each type, i.e., level of trust. Information quality or trust in the jth source is 
assumed to be a function of the consumer's personal capital (PC) and social capital (SC): 
2) ry =fj(sc,pc). 
The market price for GM-labeled foods is pr.rrfl_„ and the price of plain-labeled foods is 
Pno*-iaixiai • At time t, the consumer maximizes his/her utility, subject to their budget 
constraint M, and stock of personal and social capital: 
3) MAX Tj=fj(SC,PC) 
S-t. P labeled ^labeled P non-labeled ^non-labeled — ^ * 
The first order conditions are: 
4) MUlabeled labeled ' n^on-labeled'^ l j^)~ ^ P labeled = ® 
5) MUplain-labeled^ ?^ labeled plain-labeled P^ plain-labeled ® 
 ^ P labeled^ labeled P non-labeled^ non-labeled  ^ ® • 
This can be rearranged to show the marginal rate of substitution between GM-labeled and 
plain-labeled foods, as shown in equation 7: 
yj labeled {-^ labeled » n^on-labeled > __ Plabeled 
non - labeled labeled » "^ non-labeled I 1^ *"*^ 7 ) Pnon-labeled 
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Hence, a consumer's marginal rate of substitution between GM-labeled and plain-labeled 
food is a function not only of the relative prices of the goods but also personal and social 
capital, which influences the trust for the j providers of information. By moving the ratio of 
prices to the left-hand side, one can differentiate with respect to personal capital or social 
capital. Consider the equation below, which examines the impact of a change in a 
consumer's personal capital on the marginal rate of substitution, for the two goods: 
8) 
A change in personal capital seems likely to have differential impacts across the j-
information quality types, and hence not neutral on the marginal rate of substitution between 
GM-labeled and plain-labeled food. To simplify the analysis and without loss of generality, 
assume that a change in 7), j = 1,—f, does not have any impact on the marginal utility for 
plain-labeled (non-GM) foods. Then equation 8 becomes: 
MU (J y d^ U labeled (*) Of J 
non-labeled \ M Z-l -w- aDZ-, 
8a) U, % SPC) 
To further understand how social capital can change consumption behavior, consider 
the following example. Suppose environmental groups provide negative information about 
GM food, and agribusiness companies provide positive information about GM food. For 
example, suppose an increase in a consumer's education increases his/her trust in 
environmental groups while decreasing his/her trust in agribusiness companies, other things 
equal. The response is summarized in equation 9: 
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1 r j j  f > f  ÔTenV . labeled(*) AGU 
{ dftsv SPC dfMU dPC J 
9) [Mw_^(.)r 
Consider the sign if the derivative. First assume that the marginal utility of GM foods is 
positive. Second, the change in marginal utility of GM-labeled foods is negative with respect 
to trust of environmental groups, because environmental groups provide negative information 
on GM-labeled foods. Third, the change in the marginal utility of GM-labeled foods is 
positive with respect to trust of agribusiness firms because agribusiness firms provide 
positive information on GM-labeled foods. If, as mentioned before, an increase in personal 
capital causes a consumer to trust environmental information more and agribusiness 





10) * , ^<0. 
In this case, an increase in personal capital causes the consumer's marginal rate of 
substitution between GM-labeled and plain-labeled foods to decrease, and the consumer will 
purchase more plain-labeled foods. See figure 7.8.1. The opposite result holds if a change in 
a consumer's personal capital causes him/her to trust environmental groups less and 
agribusiness firms more. A change in a consumer's social capital causes similar effects on 
the demand for GM-labeled foods. This example illustrates that, when personal or social 
capital changes the trust for an interested party (by changing the perceived quality of the 
information), it can change the consumer's demand for GM-labeled or plain-labeled food. 
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7.3. The Survey 
Individuals participated in the experiment on genetically modified foods, and at the 
end of the experiment, they were asked: "If a source were to give you verifiable information 
on genetically modified foods, who would you trust most?" The participants then wrote their 
answer down (the question was open-ended). I was able to separate the responses from 
individuals into 6 categories.1 The percentage of people who responded to each category is 
reported in table 7.8.2. 
The category "other" contained the non-responders, responses by individuals that 
were unusable, and some other various responses that were too sparse for their own category 
(e.g. one person said they most trusted God to provide verifiable information on genetically 
modified foods). This groups also contained the respondents who said they most trusted the 
media (about 5%), which was not included in a separate category since the media reports 
information from various sources. Approximately 36% of the responses fell into the other 
category. The category government contains responses from individuals who named a 
government (national, state, or local) or a governmental entity (e.g. the U.S. Food and Drag 
Administration). Almost 20% of the participants indicated that they would most trust the 
government to disseminate verifiable information on genetically modified foods. 
The next group will be called the independent, third party group. It contains 
responses from individuals who would most trust scientists, universities, or an independent 
3rd party group that does not have financial ties to genetic modification. Almost 30% of 
participants indicated they would most trust a 3rd party group to disseminate verifiable 
information on genetically modified food. The next category is for participants who 
indicated they would most trust an "environmental or consumer group" to provide verifiable 
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information on genetically modified foods. Almost 4% of the participants indicated they 
would most trust these groups. 
Private organization is the category for any individual who listed a private entity or 
business as the group they would trust most. Most of these responses were for agribusiness 
firms or grocery stores. Five percent of the participants indicated they would most trust 
verifiable information from a private organization. The category "none" is for individuals 
who specifically said they would not trust anybody. Six percent of individuals would not 
trust any source to provide them verifiable information on genetically modified foods. 
7.4. Econometric Model 
First consider the random utility model based upon the choice the consumer makes as 
shown in equation ll:2 
11) Ug =/}'xg+ss. 
The utility of consumer f is based on choice j & J .  If a consumer chooses the choice j ,  it 
must be the choice that yields the consumer the highest utility. With error terms that are 
independently and identically distributed with the Weibull distribution, the probability of 
consumer i choosing choice j is shown in equation 12: 
z \ ePj% 12) Prob(l^- = for/=0,l,..V. 
*-1 
Equation 12 is the multinomial logit model. However, to solve the model, one must first 
define (3 *. = flj+q, for a vector q, and then normalize = 0. The probability of 
choosing choice j is: 
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13) Prob(y = j)= j for>=l,2,..V 
l + £eA'*» 
14) Prob(y = O) = 1 j 
1+5>A'*" 
t=l 
Now, one can determine the probability that a consumer would prefer one choice over 
another by computing the log-odds ratios, as shown in equation 15: 
Equation 15 shows the probability that a consumer would prefer (trust) choice j over 
choice 0, the reference choice. If P}" is positive, then a marginal increase in xi would 
increase the odds that the consumer would prefer choice j over the reference choice. For the 
multinomial logit model fitted to who consumers trust, the reference choice will be the 
"independent, third-party source" to provide verifiable information on genetically modified 
foods. A separate model is also run, with the reference choice being the government. I 
examine the probability that someone would rather have a different source providing him or 
her information on genetically modified foods. 
7.5. Econometric Results 
The results from the multinomial logit model are presented in tables 7.8.3. and 7.8.4. 
I will discuss the results of the multinomial logit model used to examine the odds that a 
consumer will trust a source of information more or less than they trust an independent, third 
party source to provide verifiable information on genetically modified foods. The odds of 
15) 
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preferring an information source relative to third party information are hypothesized to 
depend on various forms of personal capital and social capital. Some personal capital stocks 
that are hypothesized to matter are a consumer's education, their age - which can be thought 
of as a proxy for experience, and a dummy variable that equals one if the consumer perceives 
themselves to be "at least somewhat informed regarding genetically modified foods". A 
form of social capital that is hypothesized to matter is a consumer's religious upbringing, 
represented by a dummy variable that equals one if the consumer was raised as a Baptist, a 
Catholic, or a Lutheran (the three strictest religious upbringings asked about in the survey). 
Individuals who are well educated have larger odds for trusting an independent third 
party source relative to other options. They have lower odds of naming "other", reporting 
they trust "nobody", reporting they trust the government, and trusting information from 
private sources than they do of trusting third party information. These results cannot reject 
the hypothesis that education has no effect on the odds of a person's trusting environmental 
groups relative to an independent third party organization. 
As a person gets older, the odds in favor of trusting nobody fall relative to trusting 
third party sources. One cannot reject the null hypothesis that an increase in the consumer's 
age does not alter the odds of trusting the government, environmental groups, and private 
organizations relative to third party sources. 
Those who perceive themselves to be "informed about genetically modified foods" 
have higher odds of trusting the government than of trusting an independent third party 
organization to produce verifiable information on genetically modified foods. This model 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that being informed has no impact on the odds of most 
trusting any other source of information relative to trusting an independent third party source. 
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It is interesting to note that when a consumer is more educated it lowers the odds they trust 
government relative to a third party group, but when a consumer thinks they are well 
educated on genetically modified foods it raises the odds of trusting the government relative 
to a third party group. 
If a consumer had a strict religious upbringing, he/she had higher odds of trusting 
nobody relative to an independent, third party source. They were also less likely to trust a 
private organization relative to an independent third party source. The individuals religious 
upbringing did not have a significant effect on the odds of any of the other choices relative to 
third party information.3 This indicates that areas in the United States that have stricter 
religious upbringings would be less likely to trust a third party source of information should 
one be created, and people living in these areas would be less likely to place value in the 
third party information source as well. 
Huffman and Tegene (2002) hypothesized that an independent, third party source of 
information on GM foods would be welfare improving and chapter 4 of this dissertation 
showed the value of verifiable information could be large. The source would have to be 
independent of the interested parties - the environmental groups and agribusiness firms. It 
also, may want to be at least partially independent of governments, as some are not in favor 
of current governmental policies on GM-labeled foods. Of the individuals in the survey, over 
50% said they would most trust information on GM foods if it were given to them by an 
independent, third party group or if it were given to them by a governmental entity. Thus, a 
quasi-governmental entity, or a group funded by the government but not answering to the 
government, may be the best possible source to give information on GM-labeled foods. The 
key element of this group is that it should not allow people from interested parties into the 
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decision making process. Less than 10% of consumers said they would most trust 
information from the interested parties (environmental groups and agribusiness firms) and 
that information is already freely available anyway. 
7.6. Conclusion 
Organizations that disseminate information need to be trusted for their information to 
be as effective as possible. Often, organizations with competing interests both will 
disseminate information. This is the case with GM foods. Environmental groups, 
biotechnology companies, and the U.S. government all have different interpretations of the 
benefits and risks of GM foods. These groups would like as many people to trust their 
information as possible. 
The body of literature on the economics of trust is growing rapidly. However, little 
work has examined the foundations of trust, and how changes in capital stocks impact trust. 
That was the goal of this chapter, focusing on the case for genetically modified foods. I 
showed that both personal and social capital affect a consumers trust for information on 
genetically modified foods. Some personal capital stocks that were found to influence trust 
were education, how informed a person perceived themselves regarding genetically modified 
foods, and age which serves as a proxy for experience. The social capital stock that was 
shown to influence GM foods was a consumer's religious upbringing. With the ongoing, 
contentious debates over GM foods and other products - this chapter's contribution is 
developing a model to examine how personal and social capital change trust - and learning 
more about what personal and social capital characteristics factor into the trust of information 
on genetically modified foods. 
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7.7. Notes 
1. If an individual listed more than one category, I chose the first item they listed. 
2. This section follows Greene (2000) closely. 
3. Multinomial logit models examining the impact of other characteristics, such as gender, 
income, and marital status were also run. These coefficients were not statistically 
different from zero at any conventional level of significance. 
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7.8. Figures and Tables 
non-labeled 
labeled 
Figure 7.8.1. Graphical depiction of a change in MRS when a change in social capital 
causes the individual to place more trust in a source of information that 
views GM foods negatively 
151 
Table 7.8.2. Responses of who individnab trust for information on GM food 
Information individuals trust Number Percentage 
AU 318 100% 
Government 62 19.5% 
University, Scientists/Researchers, or 3rd party group 94 29.6% 
Environmental/Consumer group 12 3.8% 
Private Organization 16 5% 
None 19 6% 
Other, Media or no answer 115 36.1% 
152 
Table 7.8 J. Multinomial Logit Results: Who do you trust for GM food information? 
Reference group is "independent, third party group" 
N=318 
(Other/ (None/ (Government/ (Env. Group/ (Private/ 
Third Party) Third Party) Third Party) Third Party) Third Party) 
Variable 
Intercept 5.494 ** 3.614 ** 1.146 -1.576 2.337 
(1.134) (1.810) (1.288) (2.461) (2.078) 
Education -0.375 ** -0.248 ** -0.140 0.042 -0.321 ** 
(0.069) (0.116) (0.076) (0.146) (0.130) 
Age 0.003 -0.035 ** 0.010 -0.026 0.004 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.016) 
Informed 0.153 0.034 0.345 0.455 -0.064 
(0.149) (0.261) (0.170) (0.328) (0.279) 
Religious -0.062 0.570 ** -0.041 0.053 -0.857 ** 
(0.151) (0.274) (0.170) (0.315) (0.396) 
* Represents a coefficient significant at the 10% level 
** Represents a coefficient significant at the 5% level 
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Table 7.8.4. Mnltinomial Logit Results: who do you trust for GM food information? 





Intercept 4.435 ** 
(1.249) 
















-0.348 -0.348 * 
(0.272) (0.169) 
0.695 ** -0.010 
(0.346) (0.169) 










0.116 -0.592 * 
(0.326) (0.305) 
* Represents a coefficient significant at the 10% level 
** Represents a coefficient significant at the 5% level 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Information plays a key role in many aspects of life. A consumer's decision whether 
or not to purchase genetically modified (GM) foods is no different. Currently many different 
entities are willing to provide information outlining their views on the benefits or risks of 
genetic modification. This dissertation combines the tools of survey design, statistical 
experimental design, and laboratory auctions to take a detailed look at how this information 
affects consumer behavior. 
Information on food labels is important, and chapter 3 looked at how consumers react 
to different types of labels on GM foods. Consumer behavior did not change when facing 
foods with labels that would be found in a mandatory labeling policy or foods with labels that 
would be found in a voluntary labeling policy. This provides evidence that the United States 
has been prudent in avoiding calls to implement a mandatory labeling policy on GM foods. 
Chapter 5 looked at the impact of tolerance (or thresholds) and their impact on 
willingness to pay for non-GM-foods. Consumers paid less for foods that tolerated small 
amounts of GM-content (1% or 5%), but the price discount by consumers did not depend on 
the percentage of GM content that was present (at least over the range we examined). This 
indicates that if the United States initiates a tolerance standard for GM foods, a 5% tolerance 
level may be more efficient than a 1% threshold due to lower costs of complying with the 5% 
threshold. 
Chapter 4 looked at how information from interested parties and verifiable 
information affected consumer willingness to pay for GM foods, and the value of verifiable 
information. A third-party source of verifiable information could have tremendous value for 
U.S. consumers - of over $2.6 billion dollars annually. In addition, chapter 6 showed that 
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verifiable information could have additional value, by preventing the non-adoption of 
socially good inventions. A look at who consumers would trust to provide verifiable 
information is presented in chapter 7. A third-party source of verifiable information is 
trusted more than most other sources, by most individuals. Those who think they are 
informed about genetically modified foods are more likely to trust the government than a 
third party source. The results presented in chapter 7 indicate that a government funded 
agency that is not responsible for reporting to the government might be the best source for 
providing verifiable information on genetically modified foods. 
This dissertation provides evidence on how information affects many aspects of 
consumer decision making and many implications for policy analysts. Concluding, this 
dissertation shows that the (1) establishment of an independent, third party source of 
information on GM foods is likely to be a good social investment, (2) that the U.S. continue 
with voluntary rather than mandatory labeling, (3) that the threshold level be set at a 5 
percent GM impurity level (rather than zero or 1 percent), (4) negative GM-food information 
disseminated by environmental group raises consumer resistance to GM foods but verifiable 
information from and independent, third party source erodes this resistance. Furthermore, an 
individual's personal and social capital are important determinants of who he/she trusts to 
provide verifiable information. Schooling increases the probability of trusting independent, 
third party sources relative to other sources, e.g., private, government, none. One thing that 
has become apparent is that information plays a key role in almost every aspect of consumer 
behavior that involves genetically modified foods. 
This dissertation used the tools of experimental economics, statistical experimental 
design, survey design, and laboratory auctions. These methods present an improvement over 
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most of the experimental studies conducted in agricultural or food safety economics. A new 
method to value information given in experiments was also developed that could easily be 
applied to many different forms of information. This dissertation contains information that 
could be used by policy makers, experimental economists, agricultural economists, and those 
who do research in the economics of food safety. 
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CHAPTER 10: APPENDIX 
10.1. Demographic Characteristics of Polk County, IA (Including Des Moines 
area) and Ramsey County, MN (including St Paul area) 
Variable Definition 
Gender 1 if female 
Age Median age 
Married 1 if the individual is married * 
Education Years of schooling ** 
Income The median households income level 46.1 45.7 
Polk Ramsey Weighted Average 
0.52 0.52 0.52 
45.7 
57.3 






1 if participant is white 0.9 0.8 0.87 
All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for Married, which is for individuals 18 or 
older, Education, which is for individuals 25 or older, and age, which is for individuals 20 or 
older. 
* The estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking 
the number of people married over 15 and assuming that the number of people were married 
at ages 15, 16, and 17 were zero - this gives the percentage of people who are married who 
are 18 or older. 
** The years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not 
completed 9th grade, 10.5 for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who 
have completed high school but have had no college, 13.5 for those with some college but no 
degree, 14 for those with an associate's degree, 16 for those with a bachelor's degree, and 18 
for those with a graduate or professional degree. 
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10.2. Third Party, Verifiable Information Given to Participants 
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third party group, 
consisting ofa variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modifiedfoods, including 
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics. These parties have no financial stake 
in genetically modified foods. 
General Information 
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants 
or animals, a process that would not otherwise occur (In common usage, genetic modification 
means bioengineering). With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat 
similar to the process of how a flu shot works in the human body. Flu shots work by injecting a 
virus into the body to help make a human body more resistant to the flu. Bioengineered plant-
pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest resistance. 
Scientific Impact 
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals, 
potatoes, etc.) is based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although 
they have been modified slightly from the original plant materials. 
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removed 
essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils. So even if GM crops were 
deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause 
harm. 
Human Impact 
While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers' 
shelf, there are currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased 
nutrient content. 
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people. No FDA approved 
GM food poses any known unique human health risks. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek 
profits. For farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch. However, 
genetic modification technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business 
industry and farming. The introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to 
consumers for groceries. 
Environmental Impact 
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown. 
Bioengineered insect resistance has reduced farmers' applications of environmentally hazardous 
insecticides. More studies are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and 
organisms on the environment. A couple of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from 
GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects 
growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern. 
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10 J. Instruction Packet Given to all Participants 
Welcome! Thank you for choosing to participate in an experiment about 
decision making. In this folder is a packet of information that you will need 
during the experiment Once you have looked at a form during the experiment, 
feel free to go back and examine that form again if need be, but please do not 
look ahead, until we reach the right point in the experiment. 
Please follow the instructions carefully. To ensure accuracy, please do not talk 
to any other participants. 
I would like to emphasize that all information obtained today will be used only 
for group comparisons. No information on any individual will be divulged for 
any reason. 
Please turn to the next page, and fill out the questionnaire. 
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LP. # 
Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate choice or filling in the 
appropriate line 
1. What is the population of the city that you live in? 
a. Less than 5,000 
b. Between 5,000 - 99,999 
c. More than 100,000 
2. What best describes your marital status? 
a. Married 
b. Single with live-in partner 
c. Single 
d. Other 
3. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
4. What is your age? 
5. When you buy a food product for the first time, how often do you read the information on 
the label before you buy? 
a. Never 
b. Rarely 
c. Some of the time 
d. Often 
e. Always 
6. How many people live in your household? 







g. No religion when young 
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8. How many children in each age group are living in your household? (if you have no children, 
enter zero for all age groups) 
a. 0-3 years old 
b. 4-7 years old 
c. 8-12 years old 
d. 13-18 years old 
e. Older than 18 
9. What is the highest level of schooling that you have completed? 
a. Some high school 
b. Graduated from high school 
c. Some college 
d. 2 year college degree 
e. 4 year college degree 
f. Beyond 4 year college degree 
10. What is your ethnic background? 
a. Hispanic 
b. White (non-Hispanic) 
c. African-American 
d. Asian-American 
e. Native American 
f. Other (please fill in) 
11. What was your total household income (before taxes) in 2000? 
a. Under 10,000 
b. $10,000-$ 14,999 









1. $100,000-$ 124,999 
m. $125,000-$ 149,999 
n. Over $150,000 
12. How many people do you think get sick from genetically modified foods each year in the 
United States? (note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.) 
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13. How many people do you think get sick from irradiated foods each year in the United States? 
(note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.) 
14. How many people do you think get sick from artificial growth hormones each year in the 
United States? (note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.) 
15. How many people do you think get sick from vaccines for diseases each year in the United 
States? (note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.) 
16. How much control do you have over your exposure to risk from genetically modified 
foods? 
a. Total control 
b. A lot of control 
c. Some control 
d. A little control 
e. No control 
f. I don't know 
17. Regarding genetically modified foods, how informed do you consider yourself? 
a. Extremely well informed 
b. Well informed 
c. Somewhat informed 
d. Not very informed 
e. Not informed at all 
f. I don't know 
18. Are you employed in agriculture or farming? 
a. Yes 
b. No 




Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
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Once again, I would like to thank you for participating in this 
experiment today. 
Today we will be holding auctions of some common products. 
There will be some detailed instructions of how the auction 
works shortly. 
Because we are trying to determine values for different 
products, we ask that you please refrain from communicating 
with the other participants. If you have any questions, the 
monitors can assist you. 
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Stage One - How the Auction Works 
Step one: Explanation of auction format 
The n* price auction 
We are going to hold what is called an n* price auction today. This type of auction 
has you write down your bids on a sheet of paper (the bids are private). The way this auction 
works can be shown in 4 steps. 
1. Examine the products 
Before we ask you to bid on a product, we will let you come up to the front of the 
room and examine the products that you will be bidding on. 
2. Write down your bid for the product 
After the products are examined, you can write down what you would like to bid for 
the product on your "bid sheet". 
3. Choosing of the n"1 price 
Once everyone has bid, we will determine what will be called the n* price. 
Everybody who bids higher than this price will win the product, and pay the n* price. 
(Your monitor will go through an example of this) 
4. Determining who wins the auction 
(Your monitor will go through an example of this) 
Please note that in this auction it is always in your best interest to bid your true value 
for a product. Unlike many auctions, in which you might bid less to try to get a deal, this 
auction does not reward that. This is because you do not necessarily pay your price, but you 
pay the n"1 price that is chosen randomly. Likewise, it is not in your interest to bid more than 
you are truly willing to pay, because you may have to pay more than you wanted to for the 
product. 
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Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
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Step two: Short quiz on auction format (this sheet will not be collected) 
Short Quiz on auction format 
True or False 
1. The people who win will always pay the amount they bid for a product. 
a) True 
b) False 
2. If you have the fourth highest bid, and the randomly drawn n* price is the 
2nd, you will win your auction. 
a) True 
b) False 
3. I might get to pay less than my bid for a product, but I will never have to pay 




4. If the binding price that is randomly drawn is the 7th price, how many people 







Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
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Stage 2, Practice Rounds (7 steps) 
Step one: Explanation of the practice Rounds 
There will be two rounds of bidding in the practice rounds. We are about 
to begin the first practice round. Since some of the products are similar, only 
one of the two practice rounds will be binding. That is, only one of the two 
practice rounds will be chosen as the round where people will win goods (i.e. 
only one round "counts"). Since you do not know which round will be chosen, 
it is in your best interest to bid your true value for the products in both practice 
rounds. The round that binds has been computer generated, and will be 
revealed after the second practice round. 
Step two: Examining the product in practice round one (candy bar) 
Step three: Bidding on the candy bar, please fill out your bid on the bid sheet 
provided on the next page 
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Stage 2, Practice Rounds (continued) 
Step 4: Examine the three products available in the second stage of the practice 
round. 
Step 5: Turn to next page, and fill out bids for the three products on the bid 
sheets provided. 
Now instead of one product to bid on, there are three. Please bid on these 
three products, and remember that only one of these two rounds will bind. 
Step 6: Determination of the binding round (computer generated) 
Step 7: Determine the nlh prices for each product (computer generated) 
Step 8: Announcement of the auction winners for each product (goods and 
money will be exchanged at the end of the auction). 
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Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
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Stage 3, first round 
Step one: Please take a few minutes and read the following information given 
on the next two pages. 
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The following is a collection ofstatements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group. 
General Information 
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources 
today. There are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly 
because unknown adverse effects could be catastrophic! Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, 
animals, and food products has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM 
foods are safe. Consumers should not have to test new food products to ensure that they are safe. 
Scientific Impact 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into 
another. This process is very risky. The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) 
foods is the unknown. This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that 
consumers will not be harmed. Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that 
there would be no harm to consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were 
wrong. We do not want consumers to be harmed by GM food. 
Human Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems. The potential exists for 
allergens to be transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect For example, if 
genes from a peanut were transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats 
this new tomato, they could display a peanut allergy. 
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue. These foods are 
taking genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another. Many people think it 
is morally wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level. 
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about 
their own profits and ignore possible negative side effects. These groups are actually patenting 
different life forms that they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future. Studies 
have also shown that GM crops may get lower yields than conventional crops. 
Environmental Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards. Sparse testing of 
GM plants for environmental impacts has occurred. One potential hazard could be the impact of 
GM crops on wildlife. One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies. 
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM 
plants that were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application. The harmful insects and 
other pests that get exposed to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of 
the potential advantages of GM pest resistance. 
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The following is collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided 
by a group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta. 
General Information 
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest 
discoveries in the history of farming. Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and 
disease resistance and weed control. These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology 
lead to reduced cost of food production. Future GM food products may have health benefits. 
Scientific Impact 
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Genetic engineering has brought new 
opportunities to farmers for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient 
enhanced foods. GM plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in 
the history of agriculture. We have just seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential. 
Human Impact 
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous. A special type of rice 
called "golden rice" has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A. This could 
be very helpful because the disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world 
countries. VAD causes irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible 
for over one million deaths annually. Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of 
people in the third world, Golden Rice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by 
reducing the cases of VAD. 
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been 
consuming GM foods for years. While every food product may pose risks, there has never been a 
documented case of a person getting sick from GM food. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means 
lower food prices, and that can help feed the world. In America, lower food prices help decrease 
the number of hungry people and also lets consumers save a little more money on food. 
Worldwide the number of hungry people has been declining, but increased crop production using 
GM technology can also help further reduce world hunger. 
Environmental Impact 
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical 
insecticide application by 50% or more. This means less environmental damage. GM weed 
control is providing new methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till 
farming. Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally 
helpful discoveries ever. 
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Stage 3, first round (continued) 
Step 2: Examining the three products that are in the auction 
Step 3: Please turn to the next page, where there will be three bid sheets. Please 
bid on these three products. 
Again, there will be 2 rounds of bidding, but only one of the two rounds will be 
chosen as binding 
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Stage 4, second round 
Step 1 : Examining the three products 
Step 2: Please turn to the next page, where there will be three bid sheets. Please 
bid on these three products. 
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Stage 4, second round (continued) 
Step 3: Choose the binding round (computer generated) 
Step 4: Choose the n* price for all three goods 
Step 5: Post the winning prices 
Step 6: Please fill out the post auction questionnaire on the next page 
Step 7: The exchange of money and goods 
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I D #  
Post-Auction Questionnaire 
1. How many people do you think get sick from genetically modified foods each year in the 
United States? (note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U S.) 
2. How many people do you think get sick from irradiated foods each year in the United States? 
(note: there are approximately 300,000,000 people in the U.S.) 
3. How much control do you have over your exposure to risk from genetically modified 
foods? 
a. Total control 
b. A lot of control 
c. Some control 
d. A little control 
e. No control 
f. I don't know 
4. Regarding genetically modified foods, how informed do you consider yourself? 
a. Extremely well informed 
b. Well informed 
c. Somewhat informed 
d. Not very informed 
e. Not informed at all 
f. I don't know 
5. If a source were to give you verifiable information on genetically modified foods, who 
would you trust most? 
